

Egypt

Mid-Term Evaluation

Thematic window: Development and the Private Sector

Programme Title: Pro Poor Horticulture Value Chains in Upper Egypt

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Prologue

The current mid-term evaluation report is part of the efforts being implemented by the Millennium Development Goal Secretariat (MDG-F), as part of its monitoring and evaluation strategy, to promote learning and to improve the quality of the 128 joint programs in 8 development thematic windows according to the basic evaluation criteria inherent to evaluation; relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability.

The aforementioned mid-term evaluations have been carried out amidst the backdrop of an institutional context that is both rich and varied, and where several UN organizations, working hand in hand with governmental agencies and civil society, cooperate in an attempt to achieve priority development objectives at the local, regional, and national levels. Thus the mid-term evaluations have been conducted in line with the principles outlined in the Evaluation network of the Development Assistant Committee (DAC) - as well as those of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG). In this respect, the evaluation process included a reference group comprising the main stakeholders involved in the joint programme, who were active participants in decisions making during all stages of the evaluation; design, implementation, dissemination and improvement phase.

The analysis contained in the mid-term evaluation focuses on the joint program at its mid-term point of implementation- approximately 18 months after it was launched. Bearing in mind the limited time period for implementation of the programs (3 years at most), the mid-term evaluations have been devised to serve as short-term evaluation exercises. This has limited the scope and depth of the evaluation in comparison to a more standard evaluation exercise that would take much longer time and resources to be conducted. Yet it is clearly focusing on the utility and use of the evaluation as a learning tool to improve the joint programs and widely disseminating lessons learnt.

This exercise is both a first opportunity to constitute an independent “snapshot” of progress made and the challenges posed by initiatives of this nature as regards the 3 objectives being pursued by the MDG-F; the change in living conditions for the various populations vis-à-vis the Millennium Development Goals, the improved quality in terms of assistance provided in line with the terms and conditions outlined by the Declaration of Paris as well as progress made regarding the reform of the United Nations system following the “Delivering as One” initiative.

As a direct result of such mid-term evaluation processes, plans aimed at improving each joint program have been drafted and as such, the recommendations contained in the report have now become specific initiatives, seeking to improve upon implementation of all joint programs evaluated, which are closely monitored by the MDG-F Secretariat.

Conscious of the individual and collective efforts deployed to successfully perform this mid-term evaluation, we would like to thank all partners involved and to dedicate this current document to all those who have contributed to the drafting of the same and who have helped it become a reality (members of the reference group, the teams comprising the governmental agencies, the joint program team, consultants, beneficiaries, local authorities, the team from the Secretariat as well as a wide range of institutions and individuals from the public and private sectors). Once again, our heartfelt thanks.

The analysis and recommendations of this evaluation report do not necessarily reflect the views of the MDG-F Secretariat.

Final Report for the Joint Programme (JP)

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Thanks

The evaluator wishes to thank Mr. Wael Rafea, Manager, and all the team of the Joint Programme (JP) in Cairo, Beni Suef, Assuit and Luxor Field offices for their welcome, openness and hard work during the meetings. They also managed, in the difficult times and agitation in Egypt at the time of the MTE to facilitating the meetings with Government, UN agencies and other actors/stakeholders. The JP team also organized the contacts with the local stakeholders and final beneficiaries and the JP Manager accompanied the evaluator during field trips where Field offices teams were also met & interviewed.



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JP Fiche

<p>Country and Thematic Window Egypt / Private sector and development</p> <p>UNDAF Outcome 3 MDG 1, 3, 8 and possibly 7</p>	<p>Programme Duration: 36 months</p> <p>Official starting date: 4 December 2009</p>
<p>Programme No: 00070412 MDTF Office Atlas No: 00067258 Programme Title: Pro-poor Horticulture Value Chains in Upper Egypt</p>	<p>Total Approved Joint Programme Budget</p> <p>UNDP: 3, 246, 561 UNIDO: 2, 521, 455 ILO: 1, 005, 800 UNIFEM: 725, 888 <u>Unallocated Amount to be Programmed:0</u></p> <p>Total: 7, 499, 704 USD</p>
<p>Participating UN Organizations: UNDP UNIDO ILO UNIFEM -> UNWOMEN</p>	<p>Implementing partners</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ministry of Trade and Industry • Ministry of Investment

Acronyms

AA	Administrative Agent	Mol	Ministry of Investment
ACDI/VOCA	Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance	MoSS	Ministry of Social Solidarity
AERI	Agriculture Exports and Rural Incomes	MoT&I	Ministry of Trade & Industry
ALEB	Agriculture-Led Export Businesses	MSME	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
APRP	Agricultural Policy Reform Program	MTI	Ministry of Trade & Industry
ATUT	Agriculture Technology Utilization and Transfer	NARP	National Agricultural Research Program
AWPs	Annual Work Plan	NGO	Non-governmental organization
BDS	Business Development Services	NHDR	National Human Development Report
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere	NSC	National Steering Committee Objectively Verifiable Indicators
CEDAW	Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women	PBDAC	Principal Bank for Development & Agricultural Credit
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan	PHCs	Post Harvest Centers
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations	PMC	Programme Management Committee
EHDR	Egyptian Human Development Report	PMF	Programme monitoring Framework
ETRACE	Egyptian Traceability Centre for Agro-Industrial Exports	PMU	Project Management Unit at The Ministry of Trade & Industry
EYB	Expand Your Business	QED	QED Group, LLC
F&A	Facilities and Administrative	RC	Resident Coordinator
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	REAP	Rural Enterprise and Agriservice Project
FAs	Farmers' Associations	SBAA	Standard Basic Assistance Agreement
GAFI	General Authority for Investment	SC	Steering Committee
GDP	The Gross Domestic Product	SFD	Social Fund For Development
GES	Gender Equity Seal	SIYB	Start & Improve Your Business
GOE	Government of Egypt	SME	Small & Micro Enterprises
GSB	Growing Sustainable Business	SOEs	State-Owned Enterprises
H, S, M, N Risk	High, Substantial, Modest & Negligible Risk	SPS	Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary
HACCP	Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point	SYWRB	Start Your Waste Recycling Business
HEIA	Horticulture Export Improvement Association	TA	Technical Assistance
HQ	Head-Quarters	TBT	Technical Barriers to Trade
IDSC	Information and Decision Support Center in Egypt	UN	United Nations
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development	UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
ILO	International Labour Organization	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
IMC	Industrial Modernization Center	UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
ISO	International Organization for Standardization	UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
ITASU	Industry and Trade Advisory Support Unit	UNWTO	United Nations World Tourism Organization
JP	Joint Programme	UPL	Universal Price List
JPD	Joint Programme Document	USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
JPM	Joint Programme Manager	WED	Women Enterprise Development
KAB	Know About Business	WFP	World Food Programme
M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation	WIND	Work Improvement in Neighborhood
MDG	Millennium Development Goals		
MDG-F	Millennium Development Goals Fund		
MDGI	Millennium Development Goals Indicators		
MDGR	Millennium Development Goals Report		
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund		
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture		

Executive Summary

001 JP Outcomes:

According to the JPD: *“Egypt’s recent economic growth has not sufficiently been pro-poor. Rather, poverty has expanded, especially in rural Upper Egypt which is facing two mutually reinforcing problems; one that has to do with the overall efficiency of the value chain, and the other one has to do with the marginalization of the majority of small landholders. The purpose of the programme is to promote viable equitable partnerships between small farmers and private sector investors in efficient pro-poor horticulture value chains in three locations in the poorest Upper Egyptian Governorates. This shall be accomplished upon achieving the following outcomes (in 3 components):*

1. *Small farmers and agricultural workers are more equitably integrated into domestic and international value/supply chains of horticultural products through enhanced efficiency, productivity and viable business partnerships with private sector investors.*
2. *Entrepreneurial forms of organization established by small farmers.*
3. *Policy and regulatory changes to promote pro-poor private sector-based growth in Upper Egypt’s horticultural sector identified and discussed with the GOE.”*

Situation at time of MTE:

Component 1: Training activities have predominated in terms of activities. While some success has been demonstrated in contracts with private sector (Makro, PepsiCo, negotiations with others) it is difficult to assess the IMPACT of the JP on the target group of beneficiaries because 1) severe delays in the implementation of the JP hence in tracking impact (itself lagging due to the agricultural cycles); 2) indicators (OVI) of the JPD are not in full use in the M&E reports; and 3) the target group of beneficiaries (even more so for the gender issue) is difficult to trace.

Component 2: the selected 6 Farmer Associations (FA) and related Post Harvest Centers (PHC) are satisfied and well advised by the JP through its Cairo staff and staff in the 3 field offices. There has been one company established (“Goodies”) to act as demonstration for smaller farmers to join in and 3 outlets for direct marketing have been opened. Clarification on the business model has to be done with MoT&I to avoid conflict. The model of private companies and their relation as demonstration effect on poorer farmers has to be well explained in order to get the right vision and support from GoE. Meanwhile, the feasibility studies of the value chains for each FA/PHC have not yet been finalized.

Horticulture in Upper Egypt is and has been an important recognized necessity for decades. The GOE and several development partners have engaged in trying to develop value chains for products to be delivered to final markets, inside or outside Egypt.

As described in the baseline survey¹ (whose results were available almost 1.5 years after official start of the JP), several large scale projects funded by several Development Partners are under way. Given the thrust of the GOE to develop “integrated” Model Villages and given the recommendations of the baseline survey, the task for the JP to develop effectively and efficiently horticulture in Upper Egypt requires still a series of measures and actions. It also requires a re-focusing of the scope and activities/budget allocations of the JP.

As the popular saying goes, “a chain is only as solid as its weakest element”. In Marketing, along a value chain extending from raw materials to finished product finally delivered to the final end-user, there are many factors possibly hindering the solidity of the chain. Horticulture in Upper Egypt, while clearly being at the same time a real potential and a necessity to reduce severe poverty, does not

¹ Baseline Investigation of Horticulture Value Chain in Upper Egypt. Final Report. May 9th 2011

escape to that rule. The identification and laying-out of the bottlenecks in the value chain have not yet fully materialized. This needs to be done in order to refocus activities that will impact the value chain.

002 Key Findings:

While the JP has developed a lot of activities in a short time, several findings are keys to understand the present situation:

- PMU and Field Offices motivated & hard working
- JP staff well introduced and respected at beneficiaries level
- Overall coordination between UN agencies working, good collaboration (also with FAO or other Development partners)
- FAs and PHC acknowledge positive results of JP:
 - JP listen to their needs rather than imposing (critics to previous USAID/CARE programs)
 - JP responds quickly and is adaptable
 - JP does effectively a follow up
 - Transparency
- At farmers' level, focus groups during MTE show:
 - Training interesting, well applied and gender sensitive
 - Agricultural inputs' availability, quality & price remain a major preoccupation
 - Target Women Farmer with less than 1 feddan² (poor have usually less, *i.e.* half a feddan³) difficult to locate, usually not in managerial post, requires small capital for income generating activities (ducks, sewing machines, poultry, mushrooms) rather than crop growing skills (traditionally not their jobs)
 - In Egypt, agricultural working women perform more and culturally more prone to work in collective activities (all together for a greenhouse, for instance)

However:

- JP too short (3 years: for changing agricultural crop calendar –some only once a year, for changing mentalities for relatively uneducated population, for transforming not-for-profit associations into commercially reliable value chain partners)
- Egypt's unstable political environment has proved difficult for the progress of the JP (4 different Ministers of Trade & Industry since January 2011, Ministry of Investment disappeared, 3 focal points in MT&I, all the Governors of Upper Egypt changed 2 times).
- Late start of JP (signed end 2009)
 - PMU Mgr hired 06/2010
 - team PMU Cairo 09/2010
 - team PMU at FA level 06/2011
 - Some activities and financing strangely programmed late e.g. any ILO activity including need assessment only in Y2
- Usual turnaround of UN agencies in terms of counterparts (3 different focal point in UNDP, new country director for UNIDO, new regional director for ILO). Difficult institutional memory because people at onset are not the same as in implementation and even then change in rapid turnover. Lack of holistic view at UN.

² Wikipedia: 1 feddan = 24 kirat = 60 metre x 70 meter = 4200 square metres (m²) = 1.038 acres

³ JPD: Farm sizes in Egypt are generally small, averaging less than 2 feddans. It is estimated that nearly half the farmers own less than one feddan each, 95% of landowners own plots less than 5 feddans in size and 84% of small farmers hold only 50% of the total area. Islamic inheritance laws lead to the continuous exponential fragmentation of land.

- While preoccupied in ensuring good coordination, Strategic and Management direction of JP hindered by lack of vision of the JP as “a value chain in itself”
- The Timing is ideal for giving the JP a « Process » vision starting with finding the critical points (training & resources) needed to ensure delivery at customer’s level of agricultural crops produced or prepared from FAs and Post Harvest Centers
- So called “FAs” are not Farmers’ association, they are community based associations (law 84 of year 2002 issued by the Mini. of Social Solidarity, MOSS), not for profit and composed of people doing voluntary work. Many are not farmers but they all live in a rural region.
- Agricultural program is without MoA but ways to access some inputs/services from MoA still requested by FAs. Could be possible if FAs are helped & coached by the JP
- Time and involvement requirements are targeted to people in FAs who are not paid for this and do help the FAs on a voluntary basis. Hence right motivation is the only incentive
- FAs don’t see the need to train further in management skills and other related skills 1) if sales volumes stay low & 2) if their voluntary involvement in the association is challenged by more pressing needs
- Chicken & egg syndrome regarding low utilization of processing capacity of PHCs and need to upgrade PHCs to standards required to attract potential customers (the equipment needs are various and capital intensive *e.g.* fence anti-pest, water well, AirCo, backhouse, sales outlet, refrigerated trucks etc.). For memory, the 3 PHCs are the same (dimensions, capacity of 40 MT/day) and were “given” by the USAID program
- FAs do not have capital and therefore no working capital to enter commercial deals. Furthermore, it is not their mentality since they are Community based non for profit associations. PHCs, belonging to the FAs are in the same situation (not for profit, no working capital)
- Baseline survey not giving all the tools to measure the progress against indicators (despite design of JP & baseline survey by same source)
- Sampling at FAs for Baseline survey not statistically valid for segmentation (too small subsample 10 & 16 farmers, 12 & 7 workers)
- For FAs & PHCs
 - Capacity utilization of PHC extremely low (between 6 and 10%)
 - No working capital hinders their access to more commercial contracts
- For PMU
 - Different management requirements with different UN agencies (pre-financing rules, reporting, financial systems ATLAS, regulations). Consolidation is a “nightmare”

The Triggers for making a success out of the JP are:

- **Identifying the bottlenecks of the value chain. Based on the analysis of the Baseline Study, there is a need detail more the bottlenecks and the deciding management actions, JP activities and budgets to address them. For instance detailing the inputs to crops and the logistics to get to PHCs while reducing post harvest losses. This analysis has to be done for all the steps along the value chain. The evaluator is attaching a draft spreadsheet which will be developed with the PMU;**
- **Finalizing the feasibility studies of the PHC along the classical format (Market analysis, technical appraisal, financial statement). These feasibility studies will then serve as bankable files to tap into financing sources such as, among others, the Egyptian Social Fund for Development (SFD); and**
- **Reformulating the JPD into activities, resources and indicators accordingly.**

003 In short, on a SWOT analysis:



<p>➤ Strengths</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personnel of Program motivated and performing • Beneficiaries eager and ready • Adaptability, listening and follow-up of JP as perceived by beneficiaries • Gender sensitization and implementation • Flexibility and adaptability of UN agencies given their constraint 	<p>➤ Weaknesses</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Impact and target at poor segment of farmers • Elusive targeting of “poor” and “poor women” • Trying to get Not for Profit community associations into commercial entities negotiating with commercial clients faces cultural and economical/financial challenges and different <i>modus vivendi/operandi</i> • Description of JPs activities and Impact not reported • Indicators Objectively Verifiable not used • Policy component preparation late • Weak strategic vision at PMC and NSC level • Advisory board still not operational
<p>➤ Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agricultural comparative advantages for Upper Egypt • New export terminal at Luxor airport • Availability of financing through Social Fund for Development • Ministry of Trade & Industry committed • Many projects and funding bodies trying to tackle the agri-business value chain (possible funding and coordination for exit strategy) 	<p>➤ Threats</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continued political situation in Egypt • Export markets compromised due to external factors (e.g. Pomegranates for Syria or phyto sanitary restrictions for EU) • Policy component advocacy & implementation hampered by political instability • Many projects and funding bodies trying to tackle the agri-business value chain (will be competing, good FAs not numerous)

004 On the financial side: Disbursements are behind schedule (25%), Commitments are not making up (8%) therefore funds uncommitted represent 2/3 of the available budget.

At end of Y2 of a 3Y JP (2/3 of time), on a budget of 7,1 M US\$:

- Disbursements 1,8 M\$ = 25% of budget
- Still Committed 0,6 M\$ = 8%
- Uncommitted 4,7 M\$ = 66%

By components, the progress is visible for the first one (53% of budget, committed + disbursed at 44%) while the two others (23 and 24% of budget, respectively committed + disbursed at 31 and 17%) remain much weaker (following slide p.10).

Financials (2) by activities

Outcomes/Outputs	1	2	3	2+3	2+3/1
	Budget	Committed	Disbursed		
1.1 75% crops purchased by high end mkt	530 000	33 160	145 891	179 051	34%
1.2 300 agribus (75%women) trained	306 000	17 786	159 635	177 421	58%
1.3 150 workers (incl.75%W) gainfully empl	170 000	40 000	-	40 000	24%
1.4 PHC equipped and sust. Plans implemented	764 000	79 779	444 003	523 782	69%
1.5 PHC systems & capacity to intern. Standards	1 280 000	56 793	419 326	476 119	37%
1.6 FAs capacity to sustainably deliver services to	310 000	11 971	152 809	164 780	53%
1.7 Partnerships established with Private Sector	420 000	15 881	81 242	97 123	23%
Total Small farmers more integrated..value chains	3 780 000	255 370	1 402 906	1 658 276	44%
2.1 Feasibility assessed to incorporate farmers into entrepreneur	170 000	88 860	31 860	120 720	71%
2.2 500 farmers trained entrepreneurship	910 000	158 443	85 615	244 058	27%
2.3 willingness of farmers to entrepreneurship increased	410 000	17 940	25 860	43 800	11%
2.4 at least 1 company established by small farmers	110 000	7 940	72 195	80 135	73%
Total Entrepren.organizations set up	1 600 000	273 183	215 530	488 713	31%
3.1 Policy constraints identified	610 000	10 000	-	10 000	2%
3.2 FAs capacity in dialogue with GOE increased	260 000	35 009	59 686	94 695	36%
3.3 Success stories & Lessons Learned promoted	430 000	36 833	70 540	107 373	25%
3.4 Policy issues identified/discussed with GOE	408 422	18 570	57 577	76 147	19%
Total Policy & regulatory changes with GOE	1 708 422	100 412	187 803	288 215	17%
TOTAL	7 088 422	628 965	1 806 239	2 435 204	34%

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005 Recommendations (10) *in extenso*.


JP level

- R1 acquire process and holistic view of the JP as a value chain by coaching team to think on model of feasibility study:
 - 1)Market analysis first, then
 - 2) critical analysis of the technical (training, technology) and capital requirements; and
 - 3) finally doing the financial analysis to determine the feasibility of the whole model and precise the working capital requirements
 This will bring a transversal understanding of the whole JP process to the « islands » of knowledge and training elaborated by highly skilled PMU team i.e. bring down the compartmentalization of approaches & training
- R2 advocate for a “working capital” fund for PMU to bridge the gap in delivery efficiencies due to regulation idiosyncrasies of different UN agencies
- R3 Do not hesitate to think at the strategic level needed to change tack on activities, priorities and proposals in order to have a force of proposition to the JP Management Committee or even to the National Steering Committee
- R4 Reinforce the bargaining power force in federating the 6 FAs in collective actions and exchanges

MDG-F level

- **R5** Better coherence between JP objectives and LogFrame, particularly for Objectively Verifiable Indicators (apparently no corrections was done on original Doc by participating UN organizations)
- **R6** MDG-F: Pre-finance Need Assessment joint mission to improve programming of activities and indicators (valid for any JP to avoid reverse engineering). Benefits:
 - aligning JP start with recruitment of PMU
 - better balance between activities
 - Improved coordination between agencies on activities
- **R7** Address the issue of the different reporting requirements and consolidation nightmare
- **R8** Allow for a “*pari pasu*” working capital budget line for beneficiaries (especially for pre-financing activities only reimbursed ex-post) transformed at JP end into JP activities or equipment/income generating development, micro lending etc.
- **R9** Allow for a capital expenditures part of budget of JP to address capital requirements for critical points in the value chain (66% uncommitted funds are available)
- **R10** MDG-F and UN agencies: Proof check inconsistencies in Logframe, financial tables and M&E requirements. Financial work in spreadsheets rather than in text documents to avoid errors

006 In the following slide Recommendations are plotted against their relative importance (higher-lower) and their recommended place in the agenda (to be done in a short term, can await a bit longer). Recommendations 1 to 4 are at JP level while recommendations 5 to 10 are at MDG-F/ UN system level.



007 A SENSE OF URGENCY IS NEEDED

- **JP ends 31/12/2012**
- **Extension needed but only possible until 30/06/2013**
- **Budgeting exercise is held year by December**
- **The recommendation about shifting resources should ideally be implemented in that budgeting exercise. What is needed:**
 - **1 day workshop on feasibility studies for the PMU team to have a “value chain” vision for the delivery of the JP**
 - **An analysis of critical points along 3 feasibility studies for PHCs and improved documentation about the production possibilities/calendar of the FAs**
 - **These feasibility studies start with end of Value chain analysis (Market and marketing), then the technical part with the identification where capital grants can lift critical points, finally the financial engineering required**
 - **These feasibility studies:**
 - ✓ **Unite the vision of end results**
 - ✓ **document the value chain & identify critical points on which management actions are needed and can be budgeted. The bottlenecks identified in the Baseline Study should serve as a base but be expended and detailed as suggested in a separate spreadsheet prepared by the evaluator.**
 - ✓ **Can serve as bankable files to negotiate with other parties (SFD, other development partners)...and serve as exit strategy**

1. The JP and the MTE

1.1 Background, context, JP objectives

008 According to the JPD: “Despite its achievement of obvious macroeconomic improvements, Egypt’s recent economic growth has not been sufficiently pro-poor. In fact the percentage of poor persons of the total population has increased on the aggregate from 16.7% in 1999/2000 to 19.6% in 2004/05. As a matter of fact, the expected reduction in poverty given the actual growth rate should have been in the order of 30 percent. However, Egypt has only witnessed an 11 percent reduction in poverty. The remaining 19 percent constitutes a dead weight effect due to inequality.⁴ Poverty was much more pronounced in rural Egypt than in urban Egypt, and in Upper Egyptian than in urban, frontier, or lower Egyptian governorates. While Upper Egypt represents 25% of the population, its share of the extreme poor is almost 66%, with almost 95% of the poorest villages. Six out of the eight governorates unlikely to meet the MDG target on poverty, are located in Upper Egypt. Rural Upper Egypt in specific suffers from a high incidence of poverty that captures almost 40% of the population⁵. Meanwhile, “international aid was not geographically distributed in proportion to the regional distribution of poverty. The five poorest governorates of Assiut, Beni Suef, Suhag, Minya, and Qena have poverty rates ranging between 61% and 33%, but received between 5.6 and 2.2% of aid directed at eradicating poverty⁶....

...This programme contributes to the UNDAF Outcome 3: “By 2011, regional human development disparities are reduced, including reducing the gender gap, and environmental sustainability improved”. The programme is also in line with the GOE’s recent orientation to focus more investment and development programmes on Upper Egypt. It also contributes to eradicating extreme poverty and hunger (MDG-1) by primarily targeting poverty pockets in areas with more than 65% vulnerability rank⁷. The programme further promotes gender equality (MDG-3) (women are officially registered at below 18% of the work force while in reality accounting more than 75% of the labor force in agriculture); and developing global partnership for development (MDG-8).

Moreover, the programme addresses the following national priorities identified by the GOE in its seven point programme :

- National Priority 1: Creating employment
- National priority 2: Fostering investment
- National Priority 3: Improve income levels and care for limited income citizens
- National Priority 4: Improve the standard of living of citizens and upgrade services offered.

....In designing the project, special attention was paid to lessons learned from local and international experience. Many efforts have been exerted during recent years to develop competitive value chains in Upper Egypt. A number of donor sponsored value chain development programmes have been launched to date. Over the past eight years most of the agriculture support efforts in Egypt relied on improving irrigation, on-farm level assistance, and sporadic trials to improve quality and initiate farmers clusters. USAID spearheaded the efforts with three consecutive programmes; NARP, Agriculture Led Exports (ALEB), followed by Agriculture Technology Transfer (ATUT), in addition to a policy programme to liberalize inputs and crops pricing (APRP), and Agriculture Exports and Rural Income AERI. Other programmes on asset creation for poor farmers focused on organizing small farmers into effective associations. H.J Heinz, and USAID/Egypt development alliance programme aims to develop Egypt’s processed tomato and other value-added horticulture supply chains by establishing good agricultural practices that meet Heinz’s rigorous standards; organize, train and support over 8,000 smallholder farmers; and facilitate the purchases of processed tomatoes and other high-value crops by building sustainable supplier relationships.⁸

These projects provided several lessons learned on challenges constraining growth in the agribusiness sector⁹:

- Disintegration and lack of awareness of managing value/supply chain adversely affects quality and productivity of fresh produce.
- Underdeveloped value chain infrastructure enhances the marginalization of small farmers, especially in Upper Egypt.
- Post harvest and logistical loss is exceptionally high (60-70%) in poor areas of small farmers in Upper Egypt, thus leading to a loss of income.
- There is a marked lack of concerted and sustained efforts promoting private sector investments with equitable partnering with small growers and processors along the value chain.
- Underdeveloped and insufficient agro/food skilled labor¹⁰.

⁴ World Bank MNA Fast Brief , February 2009 · Number 21

⁵ EHDR 2005 & 2008

⁶ EHDR, 2008

⁷ World Food Programme Vulnerability Map of 2007 and 2008 Upper Egypt

⁸ http://www.acdivoca.org/acdivoca/PortalHub.nsf/ID/news_heinz12.13.07

⁹ World Bank Policy Note "Upper Egypt Challenges and Opportunities for Rural Development" 2006

¹⁰ Chamber of Food Industries in World Bank & Ministry of Trade & Industry Workshop 2008

The **purpose of the programme** is to support pro-poor horticulture value chains in Upper Egypt with a view to improving their position in export and domestic markets. This will be done by promoting and supporting viable equitable partnerships between small farmers and private sector investors in efficient pro-poor horticulture value chains in three locations in the poorest Upper Egyptian Governorates. It includes integrated programmes that help operators and entrepreneurs deal with technical regulations, standards, codes of good practices and conformity assessment required by destination markets (UNIDO). In parallel, operators and entrepreneurs will be supported on business development and advisory services (UNDP), entrepreneurship development (ILO), gender equity (UNIFEM) and marketing activities (all UN agencies). In addition, the programme will also help in developing agro-industrial value-adding activities based on local crops (possibly in cooperation with FAO). The programme shall have the following **Outcomes** described in the Results Framework:

1. Small farmers and agricultural workers are more equitably integrated into domestic and international value/supply chains of horticultural products through enhanced efficiency, productivity and viable business partnerships with private sector investors.

⇒ Baseline study to be conducted for the entire programme as part of the inception phase
 ⇒ Number of farmers reporting increased incomes (1000 farmers increase their income by at least 30%).
 ⇒ Percentage increase in average wages of trained agricultural workers.
 ⇒ Percentage increase in average wage of trained agricultural women workers.
 ⇒ Percentage increase in incomes of small farmers
 ⇒ No. of existing and renewed contracts between farmers and private investors
 ⇒ Reduced loss in horticultural products by 50%.

2. Entrepreneurial forms of organization established by small farmers.

⇒ Number of entrepreneurial organizations established by small farmers with assistance from the project.

3. Policy and regulatory changes to promote pro-poor private sector-based growth in Upper Egypt's horticultural sector identified and discussed with the GOE.¹¹

⇒ Number and importance of identified policy and regulatory measures that are tackled by the GOE with assistance from the programme.

1.2 Objectives of this Mid Term Evaluation (MTE)

009 Reaching a consensus of all stakeholders (beneficiaries in Upper Egypt, GoE with relevant institutions & ministries, Spanish Cooperation, UN agencies, MDG-F) on:

- a diagnostic of the JP as of today in strong & weaker aspects
 - Design of JP
 - Process of JP
 - Impact and sustainability
- what are the triggers for making a success out of the JP
- What are the management actions to be recommended (JP level, “Delivery as One”, MDG-F level)

This seems to have been achieved with a power point presentation done to the PMU team in Cairo, then to the Evaluation Reference Group and finally to the National Steering Committee. Diagnostic and recommendations were accepted by each group.

1.3 Methodology used for the MTE

010 The MTE, while taking stock of the outcomes described in the different progress reports received, will try to yield a consensus between stakeholders on:

¹¹ Source: JPD

- The present situation at the level of the UN Joint Program on its Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats. While building on the different reports available, the framework of Evaluation Questions will serve as interview guidelines;
- The diagnostic on the trigger factors needed to act upon in order to attain the outcomes foreseen for the JP; and
- The recommendations and actions to be taken by the different stakeholders.

As indicated in the Inception Report sent before the mission, this MTE will identify results, if possible, on several level of analysis:

1. The programme level of this MTE at design level, at process level and at results level¹². This was done with:
 - a. an improved reporting of the M&E framework which was modified and updated with the PMU during the mission;
 - b. A series of evaluation questions on Effectiveness and Sustainability
2. At global level of the MTE, given the level of its outputs, the JP can hardly have impacted the global Egyptian level. Therefore, the following proposed global levels off analysis cannot be performed:
 - i. The joint programme level of analysis
 - ii. The country level of analysis
 - iii. The MDGs and thematic window level
 - iv. The MDG-F as a mechanism

As the information available at pre-mission stage on results (source M&E framework) was relatively scarce and required an update in order to be operational. In terms of availability of secondary source data, especially to measure progress due to the JP, the MTE endeavored to generate data on:

- Estimated progress on IOV, whether explicit or not in the M & E framework updated at MTE
- Estimated Budget Implementation Progress along the Financial Table (standard reporting) shown hereunder

Total amount Planned for the JP	Estimated Total amount Committed	Estimated Total Amount Disbursed	Estimated % Delivery rate of budget
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011 The JP would have been helped if the results of the baseline survey would have been transformed into programmatic objectives and resources. The baseline survey¹³ has been used into the selection of the 6 FAs but little translated in other operational actions or determination of more precise targets (OIV). In order to be useful, the baseline survey would have to be followed by a second survey destined to measure progress due to the variables introduced by the JP.

¹² From a methodological point of view, with regard to the format (MDG-F) requested, effectiveness has to be tackled first before being able to tackle efficiency since efficiency measures effectiveness related to costs.

¹³ Baseline Investigation of Horticulture Value Chains in Upper Egypt (May 2011). According to the Terms of Reference (TOR), the main objectives of the baseline investigation are:

- 1) Review available information and existing research with regard to horticulture value chain in Upper Egypt including relevant legislation and governorate development policies.
- 2) Conduct a comprehensive gap assessment of the local Farmers Associations and PHCs and identify 3 FACs and 3 PHCs to receive capacity development
- 3) Collect information in the field and conduct complementary assessments and analyses
- 4) Conduct Women Needs Assessment as farmers and workers

The MTE should not be seen as a simple Evaluation on the basis of only results. It is an opportunity to reach consensus on the present status of the program and the possible need to re-focus or revise objectives. The contextualization of a very ambitious programme with the reality of the field in Upper Egypt and consensus reaching on diagnostic and actions to be taken will serve as the main objective in meeting stakeholders.

The MTE engaged into pro-active discussions with the management as well as with stakeholders to make areas of improvement operational rather than just measuring progress. This was achieved through a series of stakeholders meetings:

- Direct interviews along the Inception report format sent before mission
- Focus groups with Farmer Associations, PHC and farmers/workers. With attention to Gender representation
- Meetings with representatives/field visits to and with GOE represented institutions (MT&I, MoA, GAFI, SFD)
- Meeting with the JP team (management & consultants, in Cairo & 2 field offices) & with author of JPD & Baseline survey
- Meetings with UN agencies, Spanish Cooperation, the Evaluation Reference Group & the National Steering Committee

The MTE also contributed to the improvement of reporting formats:

- Reviewing Objectively Verifiable Indicators and Logframe aspects
- M&E reporting format with re-introduction of the indicators listed as outcomes (boxed indicators in previous paragraph 1.2.1.)
- Financial tables, disbursement, contracted and uncommitted funds linked to activities and (by activities& by UN agency) and indicators with comments

012 The instruments used were secondary sources reports, data collection and analysis, interviews, field visits, questionnaires or participatory techniques with farmers/workers from the FAs/PHCs (with a special attention to gender representation) and meetings with the staff and the specific consultants in Cairo as well as with the staff of the field offices. The interviews also included the personas having designed the JPD then implemented the Base line survey, the previous UNDP programming officer now chairwoman of the SFD and with the responsible of the Spanish cooperation. Meetings were held with and without the JP management in order to be able to collect information unbiased by presence. The MTE received full support from the JP management team as indicated in the Thanks part introducing this report.

1.4 Constraints & limitations of the MTE

013 The lack of description of the activities and impact, as well as the weak nature of the financial reporting format is underlined by stakeholder such as the GoE and the MDG-Secretariat (visit Mrs. Sophie de Caen). During the MTE, some of these shortcomings have been addressed and corrective measures undertaken.

As there is still no advisory committee, its opinion could not be sought.

The length of the MTE in Egypt was too short to be able to fully conduct enquiries at end beneficiary levels. Only 8 days for meetings and 2 days for analysis and summing-up in a power point presentation. Given the time spent on travelling by car, either in Cairo or to Upper Egypt, more time should be allowed for field visits. The programme was very dense (Luxor was a one day trip from Cairo with return flights) (Annex2).

2 Description of the JP's interventions

2.1 Initial concept



are the MDGs to be covered by the JP.

014 In terms of interventions, more specifically, the Programme shall:¹⁴

- ⇒ Select 3 local FAs representing 800 - 1000 small farmers from amongst Assiut, Sohag, Minya, Beni Suef and Qena. Selection shall be based on both equity and efficiency criteria;
- ⇒ Broker partnerships between the small farmers and different kinds of private investors (exporters, domestic retailers, touristic facilities...etc.), thus linking them to international and local supply/value chains;
- ⇒ Upgrading existing PHCs or establish new ones through partnership between FAs and private investors. The programme may provide limited funding to complement the equipment and preparation of the PHCs (additional equipment, pre-coolers...etc.);
- ⇒ Support small farmers through assisting FAs in delivering the needed business services (information services, legal and contractual advice...etc.) thus enabling them to participate in the governance of the supply chain;
- ⇒ Support agricultural workers through upgrading their skills and capacity in harvest and post-harvest operations, as well as creating gainful employment opportunities for them in the upgraded PHCs.
- ⇒ Support the entrepreneurial development of small farmers, through raising their business awareness and skills and supporting their incorporation into entrepreneurial forms; and
- ⇒ Engage with the GOE in a policy dialogue over constraints facing pro-poor private sector-based growth in Upper Egyptian horticultural sector.

The MTE has found that the JP has covered, to diverse extents, all these interventions (except for the GoE policy dialogue, partly handicapped by the political and institutional instability).

The foreseen activities are grouped under four Task Areas/Components.

1. Component 1: Facilitate Partnership between Farmers and Private Investors

The programme shall facilitate partnerships between the small farmers and different kinds of private investors (exporters, domestic retailers, touristic facilities...etc.). Through these partnerships, the private investors shall:

- Purchase via forward contracts the crops of small farmers at fair prices.
- Through a management contract with the FAs field professional management for the PHCs to ensure quality control.
- Market the services of the PHC to other investors.
- Train FA staff in PHC management.
- Process the FA members' crops through the PHC.
- Supervise the provision of various extension services to the small farmers.
- Co-invest with the small farmers in upgrading the PHC, if needed.
- Employ workers trained by the programme in PHCs, or by the private sector.

The above partnership modalities may vary pending the type of investor selected, the location and the preference of the small farmers, among other things. The Programme shall experiment with various types of investors in the three locations; including exporters, retailers, and touristic facilities. Initial investigation suggests a marked degree of willingness to participate in the programme activities amongst the three groups. This component shall serve to broker the link of small farmers with local and international value chains.

¹⁴ JPD

2. Component 2: Capacity Development

The programme shall develop the capacity of the FAs, PHCs and the local farmers thereby enhancing productivity and efficiency along the supply chain. Participating FAs shall be selected according to both equity and efficiency criteria....

A comprehensive gap assessment of the selected FAs shall be conducted during the inception phase of the project in order to identify the specific institutional and material needs of the FAs. Activities will include upgrading PHC systems to international standards (ISO 22000 certification for food safety management systems, Global Gap Certification, traceability, Gender Equity Seal, Leaf Global Gap...etc.), as well as training agricultural workers on harvesting and post harvesting operations, with particular emphasis on value-adding operations. In addition, capacity building of the FAs shall be undertaken to enable them to provide better services to their members; including:

- *Information services (prices, demand, inputs and food security information system).*
- *Legal and contractual assistance and counseling*
- *Extension services (under supervision of the private investors).*
- *Advocacy functions.*

3. Component 3: Entrepreneurship Promotion

Small farmers in some locations have already started to appreciate the benefits of collective efficiency, as reflected in the establishment of not-for-profit FAs. However, for their full entrepreneurial potential to be unleashed, entrepreneurial forms of organization for these small farmers (e.g. shareholding companies) need to be in place. These forms would enable them to participate more aggressively in the governance of the value chains, provide them with autonomy from the restrictive regulations governing NGOs in Egypt, and possibly open up other investment venues for the poor. This can be accomplished by, enhancing the awareness and the entrepreneurship skills of small farmers, in particular, the knowledge and capacity of starting and improving business, and providing assistance to establish such an entrepreneurial form, which could be wholly owned by the farmers, or incorporated as a partnership between the farmers and private investor(s).

4. Component 4: Monitoring, Evaluation, Documentation, Research & Policy

Scalability and replicability depend on careful monitoring, compilation and analysis of lessons learned. Equitably integrating small farmers in value chains, and the development of rewarding partnerships between small farmers in Upper Egypt and private investors, may both be facing impediments that can be ultimately tackled through policy interventions. In addition, policy and regulatory issues affecting the development of pro-poor private sector-based partnerships on a large scale need to be identified, analyzed and discussed with policymakers. Policy-related work will take place in coordination with the Ministry of Investment, the Ministry of Trade & Industry, and business associations. Both ministries are mandated with promoting and providing incentives for private sector investment and exports. Their partnership to the project will provide for the effectiveness of the policy dialogue. More fundamentally this component will provide for the active engagement of small farmers through FAs in a policy dialogue with the private investors and the GOE. Policy work under this component includes identifying issues for inclusion in the policy agenda, establishing a platform for policy dialogue (involving small farmers, private investors, and relevant UN agencies) with the GOE, disseminating success stories and lessons learned, and strengthening the advocacy abilities of FAs. The project shall conduct several studies to – inter alia:

- *analyze the value chain through a gender lens,*
- *articulate gender concerns,*
- *assess the feasibility of incorporating small farmers in collective entrepreneurial forms,*
- *document lessons learned, and*
- *cover various policy issues.*

In so doing, research activities support the three outcomes. Programme activities and results will be documented & communicated to the media, donors, private sector and policy makers.... This will provide for the replicability and scalability of the programme."

2.2 Description of the evolution of the JP

015 The main problem lies in the late start of the JP (signed end 2009)

- PMU Mgr was hired only in 06/2010, the PMU team in Cairo 09/2010 (from which sector consultants on a yearly contract resigned). The field team PMU at FA level was only operational on 06/2011, mainly due to 1) identification of the FAs by the Baseline Study and subsequent validation by the Government of the FAs; 2) procedures to rent the premises; and 3) procedures for hiring the staff
- Some activities and financing strangely programmed late e.g. any ILO activity including need assessment only in Y2

In more details:

- The JPM started on June 2010 and stayed in UNDP premises for 3 months (June – August) because the MTI failed to provide premises till end of July 2010.
- The Admin Assistant started in July, 25th 2010 – The capacity building Officer started in October 2010
- In June 29th, 2010 the PMC instructed the JPM to look for a premises outside the MTI
- ENTRUST submitted the baseline report in April 2011
- PMC approved the 3 locations of the field offices in Jan. 2011
- The Egyptian revolution started in 25th of Jan. 2011 but the security issues affected specially in travelling till end of March 2011 (2 months)
- Field offices: Luxor manager was recruited 1st, April 2011, Assiut and Beni Sweif Managers were recruited in April 2011
- The Marketing, Admin and Agronomists started in the 1st of June 2011

016 General Comments on reasons for delays:

- The recruitment/tendering procedures of UNDP require their own timing (publication, open tenders etc.)
- There was a delay for the Baseline Study, done after the start of the JP, due to getting approvals from Government (CAPMASS) before doing in field survey. Field was done between October 2010 and January 2011. The final report is dated May 2011.
- The procurement procedure of UNDP to rent the PMU premises and the 3 field offices. This after the localization was chosen on the basis of the baseline study (itself late)
- Open advertising had to be done for the accountant 3 times in order to find the right candidate
- There are many changes in all institutions related to the Project, 4 Ministers for Trade and Industry, Ministry of Investment disappeared, 3 focal points in MT&I, 3 focal points in UNDP, new country director for UNIDO, new regional director for ILO, all the Governors of Upper Egypt changed twice
- Changing the contract type for the consultants from SSA to Individual Contract by UNDP in April 2011, some consultants not renewed therefore new ones
- Ambiguity (till now) regarding the authority of the JPM in signing the service contracts (Who is the Employer?)

3 Level of Analysis

3.1 Level of Design

017 Design level

Objectives:	Was the JP designed well enough to ensure Relevance and Ownership?
Sources of Information:	<i>Government, UN bodies, stakeholders, beneficiaries, designer of the JPD (Entrust Development & Management Consultants)</i>
Indicators Objectively Verifiable to ensure good Design level:	<p><i>A detailed need assessment study before programming the JP had not been made. However the JP programming mission included people from the previous USAID program, Entrust Development & Management Consultants who wrote the JPD and did the later Baseline Survey. References to pre-existent similar programs (USAID, CARE, etc.) from which lessons learnt are therefore put in practice.</i></p> <p><i>Existence of a detailed Logical Framework with quantifiable IOV and detailed and reasonable timetable.</i></p> <p><i>The section 7 of the JPD gives a Logical Framework table with detailed indicators. The means of verification are listed. The Risks & Assumptions column is somewhat simple and repetitive.</i></p> <p><i>A GANT chart with activities and resources is provided for in the Annex III Work plan.</i></p>
Info required	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Relevance in Design: The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with the needs and interest of the people, the needs of the country, the Millennium Development Goals and the policies of associates and donors. ❖ Ownership in the design: Effective exercise of leadership by the country's social agents in development interventions

Findings

- **Relevance in Design:**

- The JP is very relevant to the situation of poor and especially agricultural poor population in Upper Egypt. Given the difficult track of cooperatives in the last 40 years in Egypt, this JP took the challenge to try to focus more on the target (poor, agricultural poor population, gender) while capitalizing on the PHCs built by the USAID program.

Most governorates in Upper Egypt are characterized by high rates of illiteracy, school dropouts, infant mortality, underweight children, poor access to safe water and sanitation. Among the poor households, the female-headed households, which account for 20%, are the most disadvantaged. Agriculture can be a main engine for poverty reduction. Over one half of all movements out of poverty during 2005-2008 were accounted for by those employed in agriculture. In rural Upper Egypt the employment in the agriculture sector accounts for 63% of total employment and it contributes to 40% of rural income. (Source: Baseline Investigation of Horticulture Value Chain in Upper Egypt. Final Report. Entrust May 2011)

- Budgeting: when looking at the budget allocations per activities, some seem budgeted at a very high level (1.1.3.3 TA in marketing including opportunity identification and actual marketing activities for 100.000 US\$; or (2.2.2.) Adaptation & translation of training material (Training of Trainers and Master Trainer; Production of Training Material & Business Games; Delivery of Training (2 courses x 500 trainees) for 870.000 US\$.
- Moreover the repartition between, on one hand, salaries, consultants, contracts and on the other side the capital expenses seem imbalance especially considering the numerous capital investments required to allow the value chain to function.
- The identification of the problems, with their respective causes, is clear in the joint program. Very clear outcomes and activities allocation which are felt reasonable within UN organizations. The project design allowed the UN Agencies to define the relevant training programs, based on short focus groups with beneficiaries. However, timing of identification was too late for formulation of JPD. Some needs assessment even late in program (Y2 for ILO).
- However the design does not underline enough the necessity to tackle all the bottlenecks of a value chains, once they are identified, AT THE SAME TIME. The importance of agricultural inputs and the necessity of severe capital investments for the PHCs could have been highlighted earlier.
- The 3 years JP duration is too short. Several classical reasons for agricultural projects show:
 - Agricultural project usually longer (yearly crop cycles, distance to markets etc.)
 - Pro poor require changing mentalities and modus operandi. Takes time
 - JP about Value Chains....these are long and with many possible breaking points
 - Sustainability required after 3 years seems unrealistic
- The JP has no exit strategy and has major risks for sustainability. In 3 years, a private sector organization

will not reach break-even, let alone a non-for-profit farmer association. For PHCs, just the provisions for depreciation of the building cannot be met with present utilization capacities.

- The JPD, in its design, takes into account the particularities and specific interests of women and men in the areas of intervention, though UN WOMEN activities are not sufficiently detailed.
- The intervention strategy has been weakly adapted to the specific needs of value chains, even more so for agricultural value chains. It was however well designed to assess the needs of the areas of intervention (poor farmers and agricultural workers in Upper Egypt).
- Actions required to respond to obstacles arising from the political and socio-cultural background are tackled by way of tailoring the training needs overtime (organization of seminar, buyer-sellers meeting (the first did not work since two different cultures/way to operate were clashing), study tours.
- The indicators reported in the M&E format are correct. The M&E format should also link the activities to the budget (total, still committed, disbursed) as in ANNEX 4&5 of this MTE so that it became a direct management tool.
- The extent to which the MDG-F Secretariat contributed to raising the quality of the design of the JPD has been reported to be low as the JPD was accepted more or less as proposed.
- Some specifics on the consensus reached with Stakeholders on the Design of the JP:
 - Weak link between activities and OVIndicators as given in MDG-F reporting M&E formats
 - Logframe not translated into the MDG-F reporting M&E format, no detailed IOVs as per JPD
 - Identification of problems relating to Pro Poor Horticulture Value Chains is however clear
 - ILO activities scheduled only from Y2 (ILO decision) including need assessment (but ILO Egypt adapted in the field even if HQ declined pre-financing from UNDP)
 - No follow-up from baseline study foreseen. By definition a baseline study requires a second study to compare.
 - MoA and FAO clearly absent from the JP though this is basically an agriculture project
 - JP, as a value chain in itself, requires a « working capital fund » to overcome the idiosyncrasies of rules and regulations in different UN agencies regarding financing expenses (pre-financing or reimbursement only) and their impact on timing and mobilization of beneficiaries and resources
 - JPD and RFW have inconsistencies in figures
 - No specific indicators for Gender issues (UNWOMEN not solicited for inputs at design stage)

Challenging factors in Design:

- For FAs and PHC
 - Problem of availability, quality and price of agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides) not

	<p>solved, though baseline study identified this as primary problem (slide on p. 45)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Need assessment should have been done before formulation of JP activities – Training would be more effective if phased with crop activities (demonstration effects) and done on the field <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Major sources of problems for farmers are not tackled by JP (neither in the Design nor in the execution/process phase). These (from 68 to 85% importance) are related to availability, quality and price of supplies (source: baseline survey). <p>- Ownership in the design:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The intervention objectives and strategies of the JP respond to national priorities identified by the GOE in its seven point programme: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ National Priority 1: Creating employment ▪ National priority 2: Fostering investment ▪ National Priority 3: Improve income levels and care for limited income citizens ▪ National Priority 4: Improve the standard of living of citizens and upgrade services offered. ○ Due to reported changes in relevant Ministries, the extent to which the country's national and local authorities and social agents been participating, at the design stage of the development intervention is low. Due to the decline of FAO to participate at the onset of the identification mission, neither FAO nor the Ministry of Agriculture have been partners in this “essentially agricultural” program.
Hypothesis	<p>According to informed sources, the previous USAID/CARE program had a difficult evaluation which is reported to have pointed out tempered data mainly on 1) the real strength of the FAs and 2) the real impact of the USAID program which was very low.</p> <p>The real impact of this JP on the target population will be quite difficult to measure since the Baseline Study had already underlined the difficulties with sampling and used not statistically representative sub-samples.</p>
Gap	<p>The JP' objectives of transforming a Community based (non-for-profit association, working on good will) of farmers</p>

and non-farmers (non farmers especially female population), who were given “over-capacity” built PHCs (high running costs) into the profit oriented informed and reliable partners of an agricultural long value chain for high value crops (speculative also because requiring more investment for cash-strapped poor population) SEEMS QUITE OVERAMBITIOUS, EVENMORE SO IN ONLY 3 YEARS, FURTHERMORE WITHOUT EXIT STRATEGY.

Activity and impact indicators that are in line with the JPD should be part of the M&E Framework.
The JP’s Logframe does not include UNWOMEN .

3.2 Level of Process (Efficiency & Ownership)

018 Regarding the Process/Implementation of the JP

Objectives:	In its execution, has the JP met implementation criteria such as efficiency and ownership in the process?
Sources of Information:	<i>Government, UN bodies, stakeholders, beneficiaries</i>
Indicators Objectively Verifiable to ensure good level of Process:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Existence in the JPD of a detailed JP management model which gives clear responsibilities, except for the nomination of the Advisory Committee</i> <i>Evidence, until MTA, of coordination in terms of supervisory meetings (numbers) but also quality of guidance, recommendations and follow-up at PMC level, less at NSC level. Absence of the foreseen Advisory Board</i> <p><i>Role of the Resident Coordinator</i> is precisely described to facilitate collaboration between participating UN organizations to ensure that the programme is on track and that promised results are being delivered. The RC did established committees at two levels: National Steering Committee and Programme Management Committee.</p> <p><i>National Steering Committee (NSC)</i> is to provide oversight and strategic guidance to the programme. In reality, the NSC met only once (13 April 2011, delayed since January by the political situation). However it did not meet before (end of 2010, 1 year after project start. At that time, it could only have witnessed the delayed implementation of the JP. At time of the MTE, the NSC has been mobilized and is reacting to it on the basis of the PPT whose diagnostic and recommendations were unanimously accepted.</p> <p><i>The Programme Management committee (PMC)</i> was formed from the partner UN and GOE agencies and is charged with</p>

	<p>operational coordination of the programme and its activities, and with ensuring that the contribution of each agency is delivered in a timely and effective manner. It convened regularly.</p> <p>At PMC level, number of meetings were adequate and follow-up generally adequate. Real responsibility at personal level left not precise and only at institution level. See Section 3.3.4. Reporting</p> <p>An <i>Advisory Board</i> did not materialize. It <i>should have been formed of other collaborating agencies which may include the Ministry of Social Solidarity, Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, Ministry of Local Development, pertinent Governors, prominent private sector figures (including agricultural exporters, investors and SMEs), FAO, WFP and IFAD. The Advisory Board may also include media, academia, relevant donors and some experienced NGOs such as HEIA and CARE.... Its role will include policy advice to the project team as needed, dissemination and advocacy of project achievements, fund raising and public awareness campaigns on the issues and concerns related to small farmers and agricultural value chain development.</i></p> <p>The detailed TOR of the Advisory board and the frequency of its meetings should have been developed by the PMC and shared with the NSC. While the PMU Manager should act as secretary to the Advisory board, develop the agenda for the meetings and be responsible for note taking and for convening the meetings, the nomination of the Advisory Board is left unclear.</p>
Findings	<p>- Efficiency: Extent to which resources/inputs (funds, time, etc.) have been turned into results</p> <p>a) The joint programme's management model (i.e. instruments; economic, human and technical resources; organizational structure; information flows; decision-making in management) contributed to obtaining a good progression in the delivery, once the JP had started.</p> <p>b) There is, recognized at beneficiary level and between the UN system (Agencies and UNRC) a good coordination with each other, with the government and with civil society. At formal and informal level, in Egypt, the communication is generally good. Beneficiaries request a quarterly planning with dates and activities/contents of training so to better prepare and avoid possible overlaps. It has been suggested that a residential workshop should be held regularly to increase coordination.</p> <p>The cooperation and coordination among UN organizations is reported as very good. For instance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ILO and UN Women, regarding get ahead training course. • ILO added the OSH programme to its activities for PHC workers in full coordination with UNDIO expert to integrate this part with ISO 22000 manual. <p>However, as for some UN Agencies, the program manager is not in Egypt, speed of response is low when collective decision is needed in Egypt, at time of meeting.</p>

	<p>c) There efficient coordination mechanisms to avoid overloading the counterparts, participating population/actors but quarterly planning is requested.</p> <p>d) The pace of implementing the products of the programme ensuring the completeness of the results of the joint programme has been hampered by the late start of the JP, due to hiring PMU staff and to procedures. The different components of the joint programme interrelate adequately though the timing of interrelation could be improved with a suitable planning.</p> <p>e) The work methodologies, financial instruments, etc. shared among agencies, institutions and the JP are helpful in so far that the project design allows the JP to define the relevant training programmes needed, based on short focus groups with beneficiaries', and also recommendation and results of the above mentioned studies. Some appreciated results came from giving training on advocacy and how to present and document claims. Claims from the FAs to the local water authorities on water adduction problems have been resolved that way to the great satisfaction of beneficiaries. Overall courses on gender issues and advocacy have also reached effects beyond the scope of the JP.</p> <p>f) More efficient (sensitive) and appropriate measures are being adopted to respond to the political and socio-cultural problems identified for gender. They are being put in place in M&E by the PMU.</p> <p>- Ownership in the process: Effective exercise of leadership by the country's social agents in development interventions</p> <p>g) The extent to which the target population and participants (FAs, PHCs) made the programme their own is good, taking an active role in it while giving their requirements and needs. Participatory processed to identify needs are in place and yield satisfaction at beneficiary level.</p> <p>h) The extent to which public/private national resources and/or counterparts been mobilized to contribute to the programme's objective have been good with the Private Sector so far. However, the timing of Buyer/Sellers meeting might have been too early with FAs not ready for all the conditions of being able to offer commercial terms for contract negotiation. Again a critical path analysis of the bottlenecks in the value chain should have been able to increase the effectiveness and therefore efficiency of the JP's delivery.</p>
Hypothesis	Ownership in the process:

	<p>At end beneficiary level, the sense of ownership is well present. The participation of GoE and related Ministries has somehow been affected by the rapid turnover experienced and by the political events affecting the country. While the MTE has been favorably impressed by the involvement and dedication of the MI&T, GAFI and the SFD, as well as with the openness of the MoA representation in Luxor, it is now again to the NSC, the PMC and the PMU to increase quantity and quality of communications (planning as well as results) in order to fully capitalize on the overall goodwill.</p>
Gap	<p>Efficiency:</p> <p>The efficiency can only come after having measured effectiveness versus money spent. The MTE has worked with the PMU in order to produce adequate reporting by activities to be compared with a description of realizations and impact indicators. This is work in progress.</p>

Consensus reached with Stakeholders on the Process/Implementation of the JP

For the JP

- ✓ Strong PMU under good and respected management
- ✓ Good coordination with beneficiaries, GoE ministries & UN agencies
- ✓ Given late start, good delivery of activities
- ✓ Less good explanation and evidences reported on indicators, impact and adequacy of delivery towards targeted beneficiaries
- ✓ JP seen by beneficiaries as listening to beneficiaries' need, being flexible and ensuring follow-up. Good capitalization on lessons learnt from previous USAID program. Transparent.
- ✓ JP would be more effective if being able to provide more capital expenditures to de-bloc critical hurdles in value chain process

For UN agencies

- ✚ Overall inter agencies coordination lauded also by UNRC
- ✚ ILO: programmed late in JPD hence had to adjust and juggle with budgets and activities to start in Y1 instead of 2
- ✚ UNIDO: program manager in HQ so some decisions take time and hinder collective decision in Cairo among UN agencies. On the other hand, decentralized financial possibilities in the field are very efficient.
- ✚ UNWOMEN has to request authorization in Jordan which then transfers to UNDP Cairo which transfers to UNWOMEN Cairo
- ✚ UN system also introduced farmers to FAO program for returnees from Libya. Also link with other Development partners.
- ✚ No inception report on JP articulation (inner JP vision done at Programme level by PMU but not outer vision in inter-UN agency reformulation or strategic requirements)

- ✚ Weak strategic support & guidance to JP (PMC and NSC)

Process (area of improvements):

- For FAs & PHC
 - Feasibility studies not yet delivered for FAs
 - Only 1 feasibility study done for one possible option for sustainability for a commercial company emanating from 1 FA (“Goodies”)
 - Planning of future activities and training could be communicated in advance to FAs & PHC
 - Rare cases of overlapping parts of training modules or conflict of timing
- For UN Agencies
 - Lack of coherence on regulations for tenders (different rules at different moments e.g. 10 vs 30% weight for financial envelope)
 - Responsibility for GoE is delegated PMU Mgr while for UN these are the Programming Officers
 - Consolidation of accounts a nightmare because of different reporting formats and rules
 - M&E template from MDG-F incomplete versus Logframe and activity tracking
 - Lack of coherence between financial tables in JPD

Indicators are not used/reported therefore not allowing assessing the JP’s results in terms of impact and effectiveness. There is an issue with the reporting within the M&E format and what has been done or achieved in the field. Overall the reporting of milestones, indicators and assessment of impact is very low in quantity and quality. This has several consequences:

- ⇒ it does not give justice to the amount worked in the JP nor to the activities performed and satisfaction expressed by beneficiaries
- ⇒ it does not allow to measure impact and effectiveness
- ⇒ it creates a deficit of information for the stakeholders including the beneficiaries, the GoE, the Spanish cooperation & the UN system

3.3 Level of Results

3.3.1. The M&E framework updated at MTE (Results Frame Work as reworked in a Spreadsheet table next to the financials found in Annex 4)

019 This template has been initiated in spreadsheet format which links the Activities to the budget, still committed and disbursed figures. The evaluator wishes to particularly thank the PMU team for the receptive attitude and the work done on this spreadsheet.

Programme Outputs	Activity	YEAR	Achievements to date (Nov 2011)	Challenges	Achievement in indicators to date
		Y1			
More than 75% of crops purchased by high quality markets (export markets, major retailers, touristic establishments).	1.1.1 Conduct baseline investigation on current and potential crop composition, productivity, markets, marketing channels, etc. in the locations of selected FAS	x	A comprehensive Baseline investigation was conducted, selecting 6 partner FA, current crop composition, productivity, and marketing channels and an extensive	Delay in delivery, data collection, accuracy and analysis of data, reporting on baseline indicators.	Baseline investigation conducted and FAs selected
	1.1.2. Link the FAS to the GSB project the CSR centre and Growth of Inclusive Markets Programme	x	Funds rephrased to workshops and promotion of group farming and marketing	Project has been cancelled and budgets re phased	
	1.1.3. Provide Marketing services and legal/contract negotiation advice	x			819 MT processed in Beni Soliman (September 2010-June 2011)
	1.1.3.1 Training and Capacity Building for Fas		FA member knowledge and awareness on market and marketing raised through several trainings, workshops and local study tours, allowing for in country knowledge transfer		520 MT processed in Bayhoo (September 2010-June 2011)
	1.1.3.2 Studies to identify new products and markets locally and internationally		PWC currently conducting a study		420 t sundried tomatoes in Jan 2011 from Dandara

	1.1.3.3 TA in marketing including opportunity identification and actual marketing activities		Participation in Fairs such as: Food Gate Fresh Gate, Wadi Exhibition for Modern Agriculture as exhibitors, Sahara as visitors, creating business linkages,	Lack of transparency of pricing system of PHC services, Commitment of farmers associations and private sector, reluctance in contracting	
	1.1.3.4 legal assistance and TA in contract negotiation		Several B2B meetings facilitated with private sector agribusinesses such as HyperOne, PepsiCo, FarmFrites, Sharazad Co., Al Fajr Co. Special Foods Industry Co, Green Land Industries Co. MAKRO Cash and Carry. Establishment of Goodies, an Agribusiness company for marketing owned by upper Egyptian farmers		
	Technical support	x	Technical Assistance has been provided to all of the above activities		
300 Agribusiness workers including 75% women trained in harvesting and post harvesting operations	1.2. 1 Train Agricultural Workers on harvesting and post harvesting operations and food agribusiness practices with special emphasis on value addition		Around 300 beneficiaries knowledge and skills on post harvest practices of different crops including grapes, pomegranates, green beans, garlic, onion improved 18 Agronomist knowledge on post harvest improved to deliver extension services in Upper Egypt Value adding technologies of sun-drying transferred to upper Egypt Establishment of sun-drying facility in Qena.	Post harvest centers barely operational Marketing of value added products	414 trained of which 76 females
	Gender sensitization		Gender sensitization of project staff completed		

150 trained agribusiness Workers (including 755 women gainfully employed by PHCs)	1.3.1 Identify recruitment needs of PHCs		Strategic plans prepared by FA members, incorporating a women's committee Operational plans drafted	Execution of plans Post harvest centers barely operational, facing market access problems	52 female workers employed by PHCs
	1.3.2 Identity and select outstanding graduates of training for recruitment by PHCs		Planned for next year		
	Gender sensitization		Gender sensitization of project staff completed, activities are gener mainstreamed		
PHCs equipped and sustainability plans implemented	1.4.1 Assess existing capacities of selected PHCs	X	Assessment report completed		
	1.4.2 Identify needed equipment	X	Needed equipment identified in compliance with quality and food safety consultants Premises Fence, Fresh Water Source for Dandara, Air-conditioning		Premises fencing constructed for 3 PHCs, Well dug for PHC in Dandara, Airconditioning tender being evaluated
	1.4.3 Provide grants to PHCs	X	Grants provided: Beni Soliman: Premises Fence Bayhoo: Premises Fence Dandara: Premise Fence and Water Well		Cost recovery ratio for PHCs
	1.4.4 Develop internal administrative and financial systems of PHCs	X	Selection of 3 Gender equity seal coordinators		
	1.4.5 Develop operational plans for services to be provided by PHCs	X	Operational plans developed	Pricing of services, lack of basic financial knowledge of PHC staff	
	1.4.6 Develop financial sustainability plans for PHC		financial consultant contracted and working along the operational plans for financial sustainability		
			technical support was provided to all above activities		

PHCs system and capacity upgraded to meet international standards	1.5.1 Assist PHC to obtain the required certifications and systems (ISO 2200 certification for food safety management systems, Global Gap Certification, Traceability, Leaf, etc..) and to upgrade their management systems	x			Preliminary gap assessment against ISO2200 of PHC
	In depth analysis and preparation of individual implementation work plans for grower groups and PHCs	X	Workplans for grower groups in Beni Sueif prepared.	Group / cooperative farming not observed. Farmers do not process their produce through the PHC	Determination of infrastructural and managerial needs
	Awareness training on Quality and food safety management systems for farmers and PHCs	X	More than 200 farmers' and 18 agronomists awareness on quality and food safety raised	Practical implementation PHC barely operational	Infrastructural adjustments planed
	Advanced Workshops o the implementation of quality and food safety management systems for growers and PHCs		18 agronomists are qualified to perform internal audits on quality and food safety management systems	PHC barely operational	Training of beneficiaries on implementation management systems
	Upgrade management systems of PHCs and Grower Associations		Preparation of internal policy		Training and technical support on post harvest handling of pomegranate, onions and table grapes
	Technical consultation during the implementation		technical consultation provided		Traceability
	Establishment of documentation systems		Management team knowledge and awareness on documentation and traceability increased	Lack of operation of the PHCs	Awareness Training and follow up of implementation
	Pre and final audits and certification				Training and implementation of Food Safety Documentation System
	1.5.2 Develop gender mainstreaming tools and provide gender sensitization for FA, PHCs and project staff	x	Project Staff gender sensitive and are more knowledgeable about gender mainstreaming		Awareness training on Good Hygiene Practices
	1.5.3 Implement the gender equality model to support the PHC to be granted the Gender Equity Seal from the Ministry of Investment		Gender equity seal modules developed and successfully tested, ready for implementation. Introduction of GES and assignment of Focal Points/ Coordinators	Attracting male beneficiary attendance Cultural barriers Lack of HR Policies in PHC Informal Employment	

FA capacity enhanced to sustainably deliver services to their members.	1.6.1 Conduct institutional baseline investigation to select 3 partner FA	X	Baseline investigation conducted		2 (training, technical assistance)
	1.6.2 Assess needs of farmers and agribusiness operators to identify needed services.	x	Baseline investigation conducted		No. of recipients of each services
	1.6.3 Identify technical and organizational capacity requirements for the delivery of these services	x	Capacity assessment conducted	Lack of service provision	
	1.6.4 Provide technical assistance and trainings needed to build the technical capacity of FAs	x	18 Agronomist capacity enhanced to provide needed services, More than 600 grower received training and technical assistance on production, irrigation and fertilization, integrated pest management, post harvest, marketing, quality and food safety	No personnel hired in Fas, almost no services provided, low capacities of FA members	463 farmers and agribusinesses improve their agribusiness practices
	1.6.5 Provide BDS and extension services to farmers through FAs		FAs prepared strategic plan with project assistance		services currently provided by project (no cost recovery)
	1.6.6 Provide TA to build internal management and financial systems	x	FAs prepared strategic plan with project assistance	Seasonal activities, building trust between project and beneficiaries	
Partnerships between private investors , small firms and FAs established	1.7.1 Conduct baseline investigation to identify potential private sector partners	x		Transformation into operational plan and its execution. Sense of ownership of Farmers towards FA	3 contracts have been signed
	1.7.2 Broker partnerships between private investors, FAs and small farmers	X	Baseline investigation conducted Partners were identified though project staff connections and experience		
	Governorate-level promotional events among small farmers				
	Annual National Conference				

	Business to Business meetings between private sector and small farmers.	x	Several B2B meetings facilitated with private sector agribusinesses such as HyperOne, PepsiCo, FarmFrites, Sharazad Co., Al Fajr Co. Special Foods Industry Co, Green Land Industries Co. MAKRO Cash and Carry.		
	1.7.3 Hold promotional workshops showcasing the work and the potential of the small farmers and FAs	x	Lauch event of the project, and Goodies (comany owned by upper egyptina farmers	coordination with ministry	
Feasibility and potential of incorporation farmers in collective entrepreneurial	2.1.1 Comprehensive study on the transformation of farmers association into entrepreneurial forms of organization conducted		study conducted	cultural barriers, cooperatives law	study conducted
	Technical Support		technical support was provided to all above activities		
500 Farmers receive entrepreneurship training to enhance their entrepreneurial skills and awareness	2.2.1 Assess farmers and operators entrepreneurship training needs	x			more than 44 farmers passed training
	2.2.2 Customize and deliver entrepreneurship skills courses to farmers (know about business KAB, start and improve your business SIYB, Expand your business EYB and start your waste reciting business SYWRB,	x			
	- Adaption and translation of training material.	x		Facilitating and presenting financial information	
	- Training of Trainers and Master Trainer	x			
	- Production of Trining Material and Business Games	x		Facilitating and presenting financial information	
	Deliver of Training (2X500 trainees)	x	68 Trainees attend life skills training and 22 received entrepreneurship training	Facilitating and presenting financial information	
Willingnes s of farmers to incorporat e into entrepren	2.3.1 Assess farmers' awareness levels of the merits incorporating in entrepreneurial forms		Baseline investigation conducted		percentage of farmers willing to starte establishing collective enterprises
	2.3.2 Deliver awareness campaigns to convince				

	small farmers in the targeted location of the merits of incorporating in entrepreneurial forms.		25 agreed on group farming for grapes 5 farmers agreed on contract farming bell pepper	Cultural barriers Cooperatives law Risk averseness	
At least one company established y small farmers	2.4.1 Provide legal assistance to small farmers establishing their collective entrepreneurial organization		Agreement on cooperation with Social fund for development Legal assistance for establishing Goodies, Agribusiness Company owned by Upper Egyptian Farmers		1 company established
Policy constraints to incorporating small farmers in value chains on equitable basis identified	3.1.1 Policy study to identify policy constrains to incorporating small farmers in value chains on equitable basis		Meetings with several stakeholders, including the ministry of agriculture and land reclamation Drafting on Study on cooperatives law and the potential of cooperatives for development in Egypt	Political Turmoil and instability of the country	No. and importance of identified policy and regulatory measures
	3.1.2 Develop Gender mainstreaming tools for the value chain related policies and legislation.				
	3.1.3 Study on gender concerns				
	3.1.4 Study on labour concerns				
FA's advocacy capacity and involvement in government dialogue strenthend	3.2.1 Capacity building for advocacy		20 lead FA members capacity for advocacy		Frequency and effectiveness of Fas participation in the idenfication and discussion of policy and regualtory issues with GOE
	3.2.2 Training on Gender Issues		Draft of adaptation of the common wealth gender and trade action guide		

Success stories and lessons learned promoted	3.3.1 Documentation of the experiences in every governorate and making the case for investing with small farmers and linking them to marketing and brokerage services	x	3 videos uploaded on youtube More than 12 articles published in several national newspapers Facebook and linkedin profiles activated Several Radio interviews conducted and aired One television appearance MOUs signed with several news agencies for coverage		
Policy issues identified, disseminated and discussed with GOE	3.4.1 Develop Policy Briefs on a variety of pertinent issues (eg. Women Farmer Rights, labour issues, etc.) to support Policy Dialogues			Political turmoil and political instability	The cooperatives law has been identified as an obstacle to pro-ppor development and a study tour to Spain has been conducted to observe their framework
	3.4.2 Facilitating policy dialogue with farmers, private investors an the government using business associations, creating a policy forum and platform to put small farmers; issues on the policy agenda			Political turmoil and political instability	
	Total				

3.3.2. Results in Effectiveness and Sustainability

020 Sustainability of the JP

Objectives:	At results level, has the JP obtained effectiveness and sustainability?
Sources of Information:	<i>Government, UN bodies, stakeholders, beneficiaries</i>
Indicators Objectively Verifiable to ensure Good Results in Effectiveness and Sustainability:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>IOVs detailed in the Logical Framework</i> • <i>Timeline analysis from M&E reports</i> • <i>Analysis of quality</i> • <i>Analysis of the follow-up mechanisms</i> • <i>Coverage of beneficiaries versus baseline has not been done and is not advised given the sampling problems of the Baseline Study</i>
Information requested	<p>❖ Effectiveness: Extent to which the objectives of the development intervention have been achieved or are expected to be achieved, bearing in mind their relative importance.</p> <p>❖ Sustainability: Probability of the benefits of the intervention continuing in the long term.</p>
Findings	<p>Overall, with a very late start and an overly ambitious program, the JP has done well. During its relatively short implementation time, the JP has been able to achieve a lot, especially in Outcome 1.</p> <p>Given the relative lack of information and OVIs, the impact of the JP is difficult to evaluate. This finding is commonly shared by the GoE and the Spanish cooperation. Meanwhile, this MTE has tried to come with a qualitative assessment and has worked with the PMU in improving impact indicators/reporting so as to give “justice” to the numerous good activities and achievements of the JP.</p> <p>However, the chances to achieve all the required outcomes and reach sustainability until year end 2012 or even June 2013 are restricted.</p>

While training is generally never lost as such in the fields tackled by the JP, a suitable level of sustainability cannot be achieved 1) even under normal start up because of the complexity of value chains, particularly in agriculture; furthermore 2) with a late start within only 3 years.

As a reminder, the JP was designed based on lessons learnt from the previous USAID projects which installed 3 Post Harvest Centers in the localities shown on the map below¹⁵¹⁶.



These PHCs are owned by the local CSOs (called slightly mistakenly in the JPD Farmers Associations (FAs)) that regroup, amongst others, farmers. In those regions, the average plot size is very small.

¹⁵ The Baseline Report mentions PHC as « Pack House Centers (PHCs) located in Qena, Bani Suef and Minya»

16 USAID project "Agricultural Exports and Rural Income, AERI" (2004-2007). The project helped in establishing and developing 105 community-based service associations in the 9 governorates of Upper Egypt. The services offered included institutional assistance, technical advisory services, market linkages and funding the build-up of 3 packing houses for 3 farmer associations in Bani Suef, Minya and Qena Governorates. The commissioning and start-up activities for these packinghouses were finalized in the end of 2008. Source: Baseline Investigation of Horticulture Value Chain in Upper Egypt. Final Report. Entrust May 2011

The targeting to Poor population and especially gender oriented might be over demanding

With 65% of Upper Egypt's agriculture value coming from holdings less than 5 feddans in size, production is hindered by the high degree of land fragmentation. A recent study conducted by UNIDO's ETRACE (Egyptian Traceability Centre for Agro-Industrial Exports) programme revealed that the average plot size in Bani Suef was 1.1 feddans and in Minya and Qena 1.3 feddans¹⁷. This results in the loss of economies of scale, leading to higher production costs, inefficiencies and difficulties in marketing. Moreover, usually low yield and impure traditional varieties are used, thus reducing potential gains. In addition, the uncalculated use of fertilizers and pesticides (often fraudulent) results in economic inefficiencies as well as problems with quality and food safety, thus impeding exports. Furthermore, extension services are undeveloped and largely irrelevant to farmers' and market needs. Finally, Egyptian agriculture suffers from the failure to link research to production¹⁸. Source: Baseline Investigation of Horticulture Value Chain in Upper Egypt. Final Report. Entrust May 2011

The poor segment of the population has therefore holdings much smaller than 1.1 feddan. This renders the targeting of the JP towards to "more poor population" very difficult.

On gender, as underlined in a previous section, the gender positive discrimination in the JP might be overdemanding:

- Target Women Farmer with less than 1 feddan¹⁹ (poor have usually less, *i.e.* half a feddan²⁰) difficult to locate, usually not in managerial post, requires small capital for income generating activities (ducks, sewing machines, poultry, mushrooms) rather than crop growing skills (traditionally not their jobs)
- In Egypt, agricultural working women perform more and culturally more prone to work in collective activities (all together for a greenhouse, for instance)


The 3 PHCs are treating different crops according to the crop calendar and therefore are not used each month (except Bani Suef).

¹⁷ UNIDO, E-Trace, Survey Report on Farmers' Associations in Selected Governorates in Upper Egypt, March 2009

¹⁸ UNIDO, E-Trace, Data Collection Report, August 2010

¹⁹ Wikipedia: 1 feddan = 24 kirat = 60 metre x 70 meter = 4200 square metres (m²) = 1.038 acres

²⁰ JPD: Farm sizes in Egypt are generally small, averaging less than 2 feddans. It is estimated that nearly half the farmers own less than one feddan each, 95% of landowners own plots less than 5 feddans in size and 84% of small farmers hold only 50% of the total area. Islamic inheritance laws lead to the continuous exponential fragmentation of land.



Furthermore the PHCs operate at very low utilization of capacity

Though the different regions grow different crops as seen above, the capacity utilization of the PHCs is very low, even in the crop seasons. Moreover, some months leave the PHC empty (2.500 sqm, capacity 40 MT/day, same design for the 3 PHCs, installed in 2008 by USAID). The following tables show the actualized crop calendar and the volumes treated these last years.

The following data was generated through questionnaires to the 3 JP Field Offices. It offers some views on the low level of production, some drastic increase due to the JP and the low level of capacity utilization.

EL-Payahoo (Minya), vol in MT	2009	2010	2011
Green Onions			50
Grapes	80	60	209
Garlic			60
Tomatoes			
Pomegranates	160	60	52
Other (specify)			
TOTAL in MT	240	120	371
% capacity utilisation (on a year basis on 40 MT/day	3%	2%	4%

No additional services provided by the FA.

The increase in 2011 is reported by the FA to be resulting from the JP. However the capacity utilization figures seem wrongly reported. In any case, as for the other PHCs, utilization is dramatically low.

Dandara (Quena) PHC (vol in MT)	2009	2010	2011
Grapes		75	

Tomatoes		50
TOTAL in MT	75	50
% capacity utilisation (on a year basis on 40 MT/day	0.63	0.44

The FA brought the following services to small holders


FAs	Services
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Al-Tod and Dandara FAs Al-Tod and Dandara FAs Al-Tod and Dandara FAs Dandra Association (PHC) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide the farmers some of agricultural inputs Provide The farmers by the Technical and Marketing support , through the Agricultural and marketing committee in the FAs Open some of marketing channels by contracting with some buyers The PHC saved some of job opportunities for workers during the period of the operation

Bani Suliman, vol in MT	2009	2010	2011
Green Onions	90	240	0
Grapes	140	320	560
Garlic	0	55	661
Tomatoes	0	60	0
Pomegranates	30	20	0
Other (specify)	-	-	-
TOTAL in MT	260	695	1221
% capacity utilisation (on a year basis on 40 MT/day	0.026%	0.069%	0.122%

The reported increase is really encouraging. The FA brought services to small holders' products:

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creating job opportunities through PHC. • Opening 3 marketing outlets to sell & promote the small holders products. • Establishing farming contracts with food processing company (SHAHRAZAD) to supply 7 tons of green beans (so far). • Establishing farming contracts to supply 500 tons of potatoes. <p>Consensus with stakeholders reached at time of MTE</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FAs have bad experience with the sustainability of the previous USAID project and are scared that this JP will also drop them • Sustainability difficult to be analyzed when capacity utilization of PHC only @ 10% maximum • Options for Field staff after JP end: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – BDS/FA – ACT- UNIDO with MoT&I – Hired by private sector organization belonging to FAs (Goodies model) <p>=>> Decision should be postponed until FAs/PHC more operational</p> <p>Sustainability (area of improvements):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainability factors not yet put in evidence because Feasibility Studies at PHC level not yet finalized • Only 1 feasibility study done for one possible option for sustainability (“Goodies”) • Consider pooling inputs requirement (fertilizer, seeds, pesticides) between the 6 FAs to gain collective bargaining power and demonstrate utility of cooperating • Work on convincing to sell « service contracts » to increase utilization of capacities for PHCs • « Organizing » by JP the « corporate » representation of FAs also with contract farmers (not owning the land) will solve the eligibility requirements to benefit from some MoA services (Luxor Governorate MoA representative agrees). This will address some of the needs and demonstrate again collective power <p>Efficiency: as impact and effectiveness indicators are lacking, it is difficult to compare them to money spent and to derive efficiency.</p>
<p>Hypothesis</p>	<p>The Awlad Gaffar FA in Bani Suef could actually be using the PHC of the FA of Bani Suliman (60 km away) if proper</p>

	contracting arrangements would be initiated by the JP.
Gap	<p>Some of the most important bottlenecks/critical points in the value chain are not yet addressed:</p> <p>1) The full description of the value chain with the critical path analysis and a description of the bottlenecks (with a consensus on who does what to correct the situation) is still lacking</p> <p>The value chain has to be considered as a PROCESS comparable to an industrial or agro-industrial organization. A feasibility study has to be done starting with an analysis of the markets to be served, an engineering part addressing the critical points in the process and a financial plan (including the necessary working capital to “make the circle go round”. It has not yet been done.</p> <p>2) The problem of good purchasing of Agricultural Inputs has not been addressed</p> <p>The JP is not addressing the primary concern (70 to 80% related to agricultural inputs) of farmers described in the Baseline Study as: “the high cost, unavailability and low quality of supplies were the main problems cited (48.8%, 26.8% and 27.2% respectively)”.</p>



3) Federating the FAs to build negotiation power and optimization of PHC's infrastructures is urgent

The optimization of capacity utilization is required for all PHCs as they work at between 3 and 10% design capacity. In some instances, servicing Bani Suliman' PHC to Bani Suef FA should be engineered by the PMU.

The MTE also advises the JP to organize for the 6 FAs for a "collective purchase of input supplies from trustable sources" (as the Baseline Study already did suggest).

4) The JP needs to review the opportunity of the follow up to the Baseline Survey

The sub-sampling of the Baseline Study poses severe limitations for analysis as underlined in the Study itself²¹. The sub-sampling used is statistically too low for segmentation and therefore to draw conclusions. This fact was highlighted also by some stakeholders (GoE and UN agencies) at the time but no correction was done and the Study was accepted. Though the Baseline Study offers important and relevant information, the sampling part is totally useless. Because of that, a follow-up Study on the same basis is not recommended. The sampling that was used is the following:

Table 1 : Basic Demographic Characteristics of Female Farmers & Workers

(a) Age	15-19		20-29		30-39		40-49		50-59		60+		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Farmer	0		0		5	18.5	8	29.5	11	40.7	3	11.1	27	100
Worker	10	32.3	9	29.0	7	22.5	4	12.9	1	3.2	0		31	
(b) Education		Illiterate		Reads& write		Primary		Preparatory		Intermediate & University		Total		
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	
Farmer	23	85.2	2	7.4	2	7.4	0		0		27	100		
Worker	17	54.8	6	19.4	3	9.7	3	9.7	2	6.4	31	100		
(c) Marital status		Single		Married		Widowed		Divorced		Total				
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%			
Farmer	1	3.7	11	40.7	15	55.5	0		27	100				
Worker	12	38.7	16	51.6	2	6.5	1	3.2	31	100				

Source: Table 14 p. 81 Baseline Investigation of Horticulture Value Chain in Upper Egypt. Final Report. Entrust May 2011

The JP needs to address the Gap in Impact and activities/financial reporting

This is being corrected during the time of MTE with supportive and fruitful work from the PMU.

21 p. 46. "Limitations of the research study. 1. Sampling issue: Research team faced some constraints regarding the sampling process; such as the fact that not all FAs' members (males or females) are farmers, in addition to the difficulty to find female labors above 17 years in throughout the crop production practices..."

3.3.3 Financials

021 While the JP had a late start, activities have been numerous and well appreciated by the stakeholders. In order to better assess the present situation of budget, present commitments and disbursements in comparison with the activities and the expected outcomes/indicators found in the Results Framework of the JPD, spreadsheet tables have been created with the possibility to compare and evaluate. These are found in Annexes 4 & 5.

The following tables summarize the financial reporting of the JPD.

At end of Y2 of a 3Y JP (2/3 of time), on a budget of 7.1 M US\$, disbursements are behind schedule (26% of budget) while present commitments are not making up (8%). In November 2011,

–	Disbursements	1,8 M\$	=	26% of budget
–	Still Committed	0,6 M\$	=	8%
–	Uncommitted	4,7 M\$	=	66%

However, disbursements have been done in a bit less than 1.5 calendar years and very late since implementation has been severely delayed.

022 FINANCIALS BY OUTCOMES

The overall disbursement & still committed is at 34% with different progress by Outcomes. Comparing the financials for the 3 Outcomes (financials are plotted against Outcomes and not against the 4 components),

⇒ the progress in disbursements and commitments is visible for the first Outcome (**Small farmers more integrated..value chains...**, 53% of budget) which is committed + disbursed at 44% of the 53%;

⇒ while the two others remain much weaker

- Outcome 2 for **Entrepren.organizations set up** committed + disbursed at 31% of the 23 % of budget and
- Outcome 3 for **Policy & regulatory changes with GOE** committed + disbursed at 17% of the 24% of budget.

Financials (2) by activities					
Outcomes/Outputs	1	2	3	2+3	2+3/1
	Budget	Committed	Disbursed		
1.1 75% crops purchased by high end mkt	530 000	33 160	145 891	179 051	34%
1.2 300 agribus (75%women) trained	306 000	17 786	159 635	177 421	58%
1.3 150 workers (incl.75%W) gainfully empl	170 000	40 000	-	40 000	24%
1.4 PHC equipped and sust. Plans implemented	764 000	79 779	444 003	523 782	69%
1.5 PHC systems & capacity to intern. Standards	1 280 000	56 793	419 326	476 119	37%
1.6 FAs capacity to sustainably deliver services to	310 000	11 971	152 809	164 780	53%
1.7 Partnerships established with Private Sector	420 000	15 881	81 242	97 123	23%
Total Small farmers more integrated..value chains	3 780 000	255 370	1 402 906	1 658 276	44%
2.1 Feasibility assessed to incorporate farmers into entrepreneur	170 000	88 860	31 860	120 720	71%
2.2 500 farmers trained entrepreneurship	910 000	158 443	85 615	244 058	27%
2.3 willingness of farmers to entrepreneurship increased	410 000	17 940	25 860	43 800	11%
2.4 at least 1 company established by small farmers	110 000	7 940	72 195	80 135	73%
Total Entrepren.organizations set up	1 600 000	273 183	215 530	488 713	31%
3.1 Policy constraints identified	610 000	10 000	-	10 000	2%
3.2 FAs capacity in dialogue with GOE increased	260 000	35 009	59 686	94 695	36%
3.3 Success stories & Lessons Learned promoted	430 000	36 833	70 540	107 373	25%
3.4 Policy issues identified/discussed with GOE	408 422	18 570	57 577	76 147	19%
Total Policy & regulatory changes with GOE	1 708 422	100 412	187 803	288 215	17%
TOTAL	7 088 422	628 965	1 806 239	2 435 204	34%

SALASEL Pro Poor Horticulture Upper Egypt MTE P.Willot Nov 2011

023 FINANCIALS BY UN AGENCIES

In November 2011, while UNDP has a budget delivery rate (Disbursement + still Committed) of 40%, UNIDO is at 35% while ILO (no activities scheduled hence no money available in Y1) and UNWOMEN are at 23%.

Financials (3) by UN agency, Planned Budget VS Delivery					
UN Agencies	Total amount Planned for the JP	Estimated Total amount committed	Estimated Total Amount Disbursed	Committed + Disbursed	Estimated % Delivery rate of budget
UNDP	3 054 422	294 366	939 274	1 233 640	40,39%
UNIDO	2 306 000	89 696	713 052	802 748	34,81%
UNWOMEN	688 000	86 464	68 302	154 766	22,50%
ILO	1 040 000	158 443	85 614	244 057	23,47%
JP Grand total in \$	7 088 422	628 970	1 806 243	2 435 213	34,35%

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024 FINANCIALS PLANNED AS PER RFW SHOWS SOME INCONSISTENCIES WITH BUDGET

The sum of the planned budget at the end of the RFW is shown in the following table. One will notice the difference in the total amount planned for the JP in the previous table US\$ 7,088,422 and the total amount planned for the JP in this table US\$ 6,939,172.

This following table sums all agencies' planned budget with budget items as of the JPD (with the miss calculation for the UNDP).

Financials (4) planned as per RFW					
	Description		Amounts in \$	Total amount Planned for the JP + support costs	Total amount Planned for the JP without support costs
UNDP	Programme Cost		2 964 272		
	Indirect Support Cost		212 392		
			69 367		
	RC support Cost @1% of the JP budget			3 246 031	2 964 272
UNIDO	Programme Cost		2 356 500		
	Indirect Support Cost		164 955	2 521 455	2 356 500
Unwomen	Programme Cost		678 400		
	Indirect Support Cost		47 488	725 888	678 400
ILO	Programme Cost		940 000		
	Indirect Support Cost		65 800	1 005 800	940 000
Grand total			7 499 174	7 499 174	6 939 172

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025 FINANCIALS SHOW HEAVY PART OF BUDGET FOR TRAINING, PERSONNEL, CONSULTANTS AND CONTRACTS

As seen in the following table, while L1.2 (**TRAINING, PERSONNEL, CONSULTANTS**) represents 55% and L1.4 (**CONTRACTS**) around 27% of total costs, L1.1 (**SUPLIES,COMMODITIE,EQUIPMENT & TRANSPORTS**) represents 9% which is not much if one wants to debottleneck value chains.

One may notice that the UNDP total (Planned Cost plus support costs) is different in the two tables and that the total for UN Agency Indirect Costs (7%) gives actually only 6,5% in the spreadsheet.

	budget item	Amounts in USD					
		UNDP	UNIDO	UNWOMEN	ILO		
1-	Direct costs:						
1,1	Supplies, commodities, equipment and transport	460 000	240 000	N/A	N/A	700 000	9%
1,2	Personnel (staff, consultants, travel and training)	1 275 272	1 464 600	438 400	910 000	4 088 272	55%
1,3	training of counterparts	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0%
1,4	contracts	1 185 000	611 900	210 000	N/A	2 006 900	27%
1,5	other direct costs(MISC + 1% RC support)	113 897	40 000	30 000	30 000		
	Total Direct Costs	3 034 169	2 356 500	678 400	940 000	7 009 069	93%
2-	Indirect Costs:						
2,1	UN Agency Indirect Cost (7% per Agency)	212 392	164 955	47 488	65 800	490 635	7%
	Grand total	3 246 561	2 521 455	725 888	1 005 800	7 499 704	100%

It is recommended that the financial tables in all documents (especially in Project Documents where this type of errors are not uncommon), should be done in spreadsheet formats with totals resulting of cell combinations rather than using text treatments which do not show mathematical errors.

3.3.3. Reporting

026 The MDG-F required reporting is given as follows:

Summary of required reporting	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3
	Inception report 4 Quarter financial updates 1 Annual Narrative and Financial Report 2 Monitoring reports Annual review report	4 Quarter financial updates 1 Annual Narrative and Financial Report 2 Monitoring reports 1 Mid-term Evaluation report Annual Review report	4 Quarter financial updates 1 Annual Narrative and Financial Report 2 Monitoring reports 1 Final evaluation report

027 The reporting by the different supervisory bodies of the JP was found by MTE as follows:

Available	Not available	Observations by MTE
Monitoring Report 1 st and 2 nd semester 2010, 1 st semester 2011	None for 2009	Weak reporting on Financial and indicators
3 undated progress reports (received Nov 2) on Assiut, Beni Sweif & Luxor field offices	No previous ones	No single reporting format. Undated. Some reports more detailed on

		content and indicators
Bi-annual reports (July 2010, Jan 2011, July 2011)		
AWP color (Oct 2010, March and Sept 2011)		
Inception report June 2010 from the PMU Manager		No advisory committee nominated hence no inception report from it.
Program Management Committees (March 2009, 2 and 13 May 2010, June 29 2010, October 18 2010, Jan 27 2011, May 22 2011, Sept 12 2011)		Minutes well written. Sometimes person for ACTION not mentioned (never in personne) and DEADLINE never filled
Inception report June 2010		
National Steering Committee minutes (first 13 April 2011)	No previous, no following meeting	Very late 1 st meeting of NSC (not convened before the January 2011 political events). NSC debriefed at MTE (their 2 nd meeting)

There is an issue with the reporting within the M&E format compared to what has been done or achieved in the field. Overall, in this JP, the reporting of milestones, indicators and assessment of impact is very low in quantity and quality. This has several consequences:

- it does not give justice to the amount worked in the JP
- it does not allow to measure impact and effectiveness, hence efficiency
- it creates a deficit of information for the stakeholders including the GoE and the Spanish cooperation

This has been put in evidence during MTE and agreed upon. Corrective measures are initiated. New formats in spreadsheet format were filled during the MTE and are shown in Annexes 4 & 5. This will help to identify how to re focus more effectively and efficiently the JP for its remaining timeframe.

4. The global level of this MTE

028 The findings: At global level of the MTE, given the level of its outputs, the JP can hardly have impacted the global Egyptian level. Therefore, the following proposed global levels off analysis (requirements of the MDG-F Evaluation methodology) cannot be adequately performed.

i. The joint programme level of analysis:

Objectives:	Measure of the change induced by the joint programme on/by citizens, institutions and other program stakeholders
Sources of Information:	<i>Interviews, documentation requested by MTE to PMU and JP Field Offices.</i>

Indicators Objectively Verifiable:	<i>Some increase in MT of crops processed by some PHCs. None at this stage</i>
Info	
Findings	At beneficiary level, the JP is said to have brought beneficial training in technical levels and in a series of soft skills. The indicators are described in 3.3.1. paragraph 023
Hypothesis	
Gap	A general insufficient level of quantitative or qualitative details on OVI hinders the assessment of the real impact of the JP. The MTE advocates that results exceed by far what is described. Improvement of the reporting process has been initiated during the MTE.

ii. The country level of analysis

Objectives:	Measure the contribution and induced effect of the joint programme on national development priorities as derived from their combined action in a specific country context.
Sources of Information:	<i>Relevant Ministries, UN bodies, other Development Partners</i>
Indicators Objectively Verifiable:	<i>Regional trade flows, quantities shipped towards end of value chain, sales volume (quantities, price structure) at end user level.</i>
Info	Unavailable at this stage
Findings	None
Hypothesis	Traceability tracking in progress at MoT&I and at UNIDO
Gap	Indicators absent

iii. The MDGs and thematic window level of analysis

Objectives:	Review the contribution and induced effect of joint programme in the eight MDG-F thematic areas and their contribution towards MDG achievement at the national level
Sources of Information:	<i>TBD</i>
Indicators Objectively Verifiable:	<i>TBD</i>
Info	Unavailable at this stage
Findings	None
Hypothesis	Indicators are being refined by PMU
Gap	Indicators absent

iv. The MDG-F as a mechanism

Objectives:	Systematic and rigorous synthesis of the above mentioned units into two pieces of comprehensive and evidence based work-mid-term and final reports.
Sources of Information:	<i>TBD</i>

Indicators Objectively Verifiable:	<i>TBD</i>
Info	Unavailable at this stage
Findings	None
Hypothesis	Indicators are being refined by PMU
Gap	Indicators absent

5. Lessons learned

5.1. JP level

029 At JP level, identification of needs to formulate a complex JP set up should be done in as much details as possible before the set up (impact, effectiveness, and efficiency).

This would also accelerate the implementation speed.

The emphasis on reporting along activities indicators and impact indicators should prevail from the start.

5.2. UN agencies' level

030 An advisory board, foreseen by the JPD ("The detailed TOR of the Advisory board and the frequency of its meetings will be developed by the PMC and shared with the NSC") might have helped the PMC and the NSC to better re orient the JP earlier.

031 It is recommended that the financial tables in all documents (especially in Project Documents where this type of errors are not uncommon), should be done in spreadsheet formats with totals resulting of cell combinations rather than using text treatments which do not show mathematical errors.

The UN Agencies requirements regarding reporting and financial consolidation are taking considerable time for the PMU. For joint programs, there is a crying need to unify the reporting in order to avoid the duplication of work of the PMU for each UN agency. A common format would simplify the matter. On the financial reporting, consolidation is described as a "nightmare".

"Pass through" financing has limitations when it comes to rapid implementation in Egypt when the decision levels for UN Agencies are not in Egypt.

5.3. MDG-F level

032 The MDG-F has accepted a very ambitious JP without reviewing it to ensure realistic impact and sustainability. Exit strategies should be explicitly be mentioned in JPDs.

Joint Programs of a magnitude of 7.5 M US\$ should have themselves a working capital in order to accommodate the complexity of the different UN financing regulations. This could be a sinking fund transformed at the end of activities.

Reporting and impact indicators are of utmost importance for sponsors like the Spanish Cooperation, itself under scrutiny of the tax-payers financing the UN system. While having raised the concern, MDG-F should put in place the means to follow through on its concern.

Assessment of needs require to be 1) early before programming and 2) thorough enough to be able to program and give budget to the debottlenecking activities required to activate a (long) value chain.

While incorporating lessons learnt from the previous USAID programs, the formulation of the JP was done with a weak assessment of needs. It was not thorough enough to foresee the complexity of the challenge in time and in the necessity tackling to simultaneous value chain bottlenecks. The Baseline Study identified bottlenecks which should have been identified before in order to better “program” the JP accordingly.

033 The Baseline Survey came rather late. Some further need assessments e.g. for ILO were scheduled to start only, as for all ILO activities in year 2. This impacted the whole implementation of the JP as the FAs had first to be selected, and then agreed upon, then only Field Offices could be opened and finally staff recruited. Parallel processing could have been done while avoiding the sequential treatment of information which delay the whole JP.

034 JP is considered by all stakeholders as too short but the term of 3 years was imposed by MDG-F. Indeed, at design time, the following considerations should have been raised:

- 1) As mentioned, agricultural projects take long time since they are based on the calendar of crops and differ from continuous industrial production. Therefore, the learning curve is usually rather more flat; moreover
- 2) value chains are complex and require simultaneous debottlenecking otherwise the whole value chain does not work (1 element of the chain is enough to break it);
- 3) not least important, the civil associations helped (called here Farmers’ Associations) are not-for-profit organizations with a different mentality and motivation (they work unpaid) than the private sector clients towards the agricultural production is destined (Egypt, exports).
- 4) The final difficulty resides in the fact that without a clear demonstration of richer farmers on the profitability of investing in new “speculative” crops, poors won’t be convinced. Only after having witnessed this success (which takes a couple of years) will the poorer agricultural target group be sensitized and convinced. Gender priorities should also have been put more in line with the local culture as females in Upper Egypt usually do not work on production directly.

It is recommended that the financial tables in all documents (especially in Project Documents where this type of errors are not uncommon throughout UN evaluations), should be done in spreadsheet formats with totals resulting of cell combinations rather than using text treatments which do not show mathematical errors.

The Table1 Results Framework does not allow, in its present format, to compare activities and budget disbursed or committed. A spreadsheet format would also be advisable.

035 The M&E format does not allow, in its present format, to compare 1) activities, achievements to date, indicators, challenges; to 2) budget, disbursements or present commitment.

036 As such a management/financial dashboard for JP management does not exist and consist of several tables. A consolidated version would ease the management process. A spreadsheet format would also be advisable. A model was developed with the PMU team during the MTE. The spreadsheet is available now.

6. Recommendations

037 A SENSE OF URGENCY IS NEEDED

- JP ends 31/12/2012
- Extension needed but only possible until 30/06/2013
- Budgeting exercise is held year by December
- The recommendation about shifting resources should ideally be implemented in that budgeting exercise. What is needed:
 - 1 day workshop on feasibility studies for the PMU team to have a “value chain” vision for the delivery of the JP
 - An analysis of critical points along 3 feasibility studies for PHCs and improved documentation about the production possibilities/calendar of the FAs
 - These feasibility studies start with end of Value chain analysis (Market and marketing), then the technical part with the identification where capital grants can lift critical points, finally the financial engineering required
 - These feasibility studies:
 - ✓ Unite the vision of end results
 - ✓ document the value chain & identify critical points on which management actions are needed and can be budgeted. The bottlenecks identified in the Baseline Study should serve as a base but be expended and detailed as suggested in a separate spreadsheet prepared by the evaluator.
 - ✓ Can serve as bankable files to negotiate with other parties (SFD, other development partners)...and serve as exit strategy

6.1. JP level

038 Recommendations 1 to 4 are at JP level:

- R1 acquire process and holistic view of the JP as a value chain by coaching team to think on model of feasibility study:
 - 1)Market analysis first, then
 - 2) critical analysis of the technical (training, technology) and capital requirements; and
 - 3) finally doing the financial analysis to determine the feasibility of the whole model and precise the working capital requirements

This will bring a transversal understanding of the whole JP process to the « islands » of knowledge and training elaborated by highly skilled PMU team i.e. bring down the compartmentalization of approaches & training


- R2 advocate for a “working capital” fund for PMU to bridge the gap in delivery efficiencies due to regulation idiosyncrasies of different UN agencies
- R3 Do not hesitate to think at the strategic level needed to change tack on activities, priorities and proposals in order to have a force of proposition to the JP Management Committee or even to the National Steering Committee
- R4 Reinforce the bargaining power force in federating the 6 FAs in collective actions and exchanges

6.2. MDG-F and UN agencies' level

039 Recommendations 5 to 10 are at MDG-F/ UN system level:

- R5 Better coherence between JP objectives and Log Frame, particularly for Objectively Verifiable Indicators (apparently no corrections was done on original Doc by participating UN)
- R6 MDG-F: Pre-finance Need Assessment joint mission to improve programming of activities and indicators (valid for any JP to avoid reverse engineering). Benefits:
 - aligning JP start with recruitment of PMU
 - better balance between activities
 - Improved coordination between agencies on activities
- R7 Address the issue of the different reporting requirements and consolidation nightmare
- R8 Allow for a “*pari pasu*” working capital budget line for beneficiaries (especially for pre-financing activities only reimbursed ex-post) transformed at JP end into JP activities or equipment/income generating development micro lending etc.
- R9 Allow for a capital expenditures part of budget of JP to address capital requirements for critical points in the value chain (66% uncommitted)
- R10 MDG-F and UN agencies: Proof check inconsistencies in Logframe, financial tables and M&E requirements

040 In the following slide, the 10 recommendations are plotted against their relative importance (higher-lower) and their recommended place in the agenda (to be done in a short term or can await a bit longer).



7. Annexes

7.1. Annex 1: List of personas met

Name		Organization	E.mail	TEL/Mobile
Maya Morsy	UN Women	UN Women Country Director	maya.morsy@unwomen.org	23801720 (office)
Alaa Fahmy	Technical Advisor	ATC/UNIDO	A.Fahmy@unido.org	0100397575
Matteo Valenza	Programme Officer	UNIDO	M.Valenza@unido.org	(0)1512129622
Mohamed Bayoumy	ARR/ Team Leader	UNDP	Mohamed.Bayoumi@undp.org	2578 4840-6 (office)
Sara Sabry	Programme Assistant	UNDP	sara.sabri@undp.org	2578 4840-6 (office)
Regine Kilchenmann	Joint Programme	UNRC	Regine.Kilchenmann@one.un.org	2578 4840-6 (office)
Frederik Matthys		UNRC		2578 4840-6 (office)
Magdy Wahba	Project Coordinator	ILO	wahba@ilo.org	0101402019
Moustafa Abdelzaher	Chairperson	Beni Soliman FA Beni Sweif	-	0105704437
Samy Mahrous	Chairperson	Awlad Gafar FA Beni Sweif governorate	-	0143780246
Hassan Basry	Chairperson	El Tod FA Luxor governorate	-	0142052145
Mahmoud Abu Elazayem	Chairperson	El Baiho FA Minia	-	0101663952
Hehsam Shaql	Chairperson	Dandra FA Qena	shaqal1970@yahoo.com	0199953331

DATE: 14th of November 2011

TYPE Reference group meeting with Mr. Patrik Willot

LOCATION: PMU Office

Duration From 2:30 pm to 5:30 pm

Participants:

Name	Agency
------	--------

Patrik Willot	Evaluator
Wael Rafea	Joint Program Manager
Maya Morsy	UN Women
Alaa Fahmy	ATC/UNIDO
Matteo Valenza	UNIDO
Mohamed Bayoumy	UNDP
Sara Sabry	UNDP
Regine Kilchenmann	UNRC
Frederik Matthys	UNRC
Magdy Wahba	ILO
Moustafa Abdelzaher	Beni Soliman FA - Beni Sweif governorate
Samy Mahrous	Awlad Gafar FA - Beni Sweif governorate
Hassan Basry	El Tod FA - Luxor governorate
Mahmoud Abu Elazayem	El Baiho FA – Minia governorate
Hehsam Shaql	Dandra FA - Qena governorate

The schedule and the participants during the visit

Which conducted through Luxor Office Sunday 20 – 11 – 2011

Time	Place	Names of Participants	Position
From 9:20 am to 12:30 pm	Arrival Dandra Association	Hesham Mohamed Kamal	Dandra Association Chairman
		Arft Taha Ahmed	Member
		Amer Ali Mohamed	Member
		Ahmed Mohamed Abdelfatah	Member
		Rasha Ahmed Sharkawy	Member
		Maha Mohamed Hussien	Worker in the PHC
		Nagla Hussien	Worker in the PHC
		Kawser Saleh Abdelwahab	Worker in the PHC
		Fatma Hussien	Worker in the PHC
		Huda Badwy Fekry	Worker in the PHC
		Fatma Badwy Saied	Worker in the PHC
		Abeer Ahmed	Worker in the PHC
From 12:30 to 2:00 pm	Arrival Luxor		
From 2:00 to 3:00 pm	Meeting with Lux. Agricultural directorate manager	Dr. Ahmed El Katatny	Manger
		Sawsan Mohamed Mustafa	Assistant of office manager
From 3:00 to 3:40 pm	Attend the TOT training program which conducted by ILO In Luxor		
From 3:40 to 5:10	Meeting inside Luxor office with Al-Tod Association , Aula-	Hassan Ahmed Bassry	Al Tod Association chairman

pm	Yaheia Association members and Luxor office staff	Mareet Nader Mofied	Member in Al-Tod Association
		Amal Abd-Elazez Mohamed	Member in Al-Tod Association
		Samia Ebied Azez	Member in Al-Tod Association
		Gehan Saleeb	Member in Al-Tod Association
		Amena Anor Kenawy	Member in Al-Tod Association
		El Nopy Hefny Salem	Luxor office manager
		Hany Saadelden Nashed	Marketing officer in Luxor office
		Asmaa Abdelhady Hussien	Administrative assistance in Luxor office
		Omar Hamada Reyad	Agronomist in Luxor office
		Mohamed Gamal Elden Soliman	Agronomist in Luxor office
		Yusef Abd –Elateif	Aula- Yaheia Assoc. Chairman

Meeting in P.H.C. ELbayahoo (Minia Gov.) .on 17-11-2011

No.	Names	Title
1	Mostafa Abdel Zaher Ahmed	Chairman
2	Amer Mohamed Mostafa	Executive Manger
3	Hassan Mohisn Abdel Latif	PHC Manager
4	Taha Mostafa Ahmed	Accountant
5	Hassan Mostafa Ahmed	FA Member
6	Badria Taha Mahmoud	FA Secretary
7	Sabreen Khaled	FA Member
8	Asmaa Nan	PHC Worker
9	Asmaa Mohamed	PHC Worker

List of participants to Gaafar FA

N	The names of attendees	Fa names
1-	Mohamed Sayed Ramadan	ELbayahoo Assoc.
2-	Wafaa Massoud Mohamed	Elbayahoo Assoc.
3-	Asmaa Hussun	Elbayahoo Assoc.
4-	Sameh Engly Ghattas	ELbayahoo Assoc.
5-	Shalabi Rushdi Mohamed	Elbayahoo Assoc.
6-	Hussein Khalaf Ali	Elbayahoo Assoc.
7-	Toba shady Ali	Elbayahoo Assoc.
8-	Marwa Eed Rashidi	Elbayahoo Assoc.
9-	Araby kuleny	Elamodeen Assoc.
1	Wafa Farook Khalil	Elamodeen Assoc.
0-	Sayeed Mohamed Ali	EGy Green Export company
1-	Ali Mohamed Ali	EGy Green Export company
2-		

Evaluation visit to Beni Soliman FA

No.	Names	Title
1	Samy Mahrous	Executive Manager
2	Seif El Masih Mahrous	Project coordinator
3	Milad Gerges	Financial Manager
4	Marim Tawfeek	Secretary
5	Rashad Abdel Hameed	Board member
6	Amal Gerges	Board member
7	Marina Samy	Volunteer
8	Magdy welson	Agri. Commit member
9	Suzan Hana	Agri. Commit member
10	Sanaa Nagib	Agri. Commit member
11	Nadia Mamdouh	Farmer
12	Sahar Sobhi	Farmer
13	Samia Adly	Farmer
14	Malaka Gerges	Farmer
15	Domiana Gerges	Farmer
16	Zozo Shokry	Farmer
17	Soad Ayd Shaker	Lending officer

7.2. Annex 2: Programme of mission to Egypt

Meetings

<u>Time</u>	<u>Name:</u>	<u>Org. / Title</u>	<u>Venue</u>	<u>Status</u>
<u>Sunday, 13 November</u>				
9:00 PM	Arrival Flight number: EGYPTAIR - MS 726 Accommodation: Marriott Hotel, Zamalek - Tel: 27283000			Confirmed
<u>Monday, 14 November</u>				
9:00 – 12:00	Meeting with the Joint Program Manager and the PMU members	Wael Rafea Bahaa Ismail Olfa Tantawi Laila Kenawy Rafik Hamdy Khaled Shedeed Hoda El Mankabady	Joint Program Manager Deputy JPM Communication Officer M&E Officer Capacity Building Officer Quality & food Safety expert Gender Officer	PMU Office Confirmed

		Hesham Farrag	Accountant		
		Magdy Wahba	Project Coordinator, ILO		
		Shaimaa Reda	Administrative Assistant		
1:00 – 1:30	Meeting with Mr. James Rawley, UN Resident Coordinator and Mr. Mounir Tabet, UNDP Country Director			UNDP Office	Confirmed
2:00 – 3:30	Meeting with the Evaluation Reference Group	<u>Reference Group :</u>	-	PMU Office	Confirmed
		Maya Morsy	UN Women		
		Kholoud Al Khaldy / Magdy Wahba	ILO		
		Matteo Valenza	UNIDO		
		Frederik MATTHYS, Ms.Regine KILCHENMANN	UNRC		
		Mohamed Bayoumy	UNDP		
		?	MTI		
		Wael Rafea	SALASEL Project		
		Farmer Associations Chairpersons (6)			
<u>Tuesday, 15 November</u>					
9:00 - 9:30	Meeting with UN Women Country Coordinator	Dr. Maya Morsy,		PMU Office	Confirmed
10:00 -	Meeting with UNIDO	Ms. Giovanna Ceglie		UNIDO Office	

10:30	Representative and Head of the Regional Office and UNIDO Officer	Ms. Giovanna Ceglie, Mr. Matteo Valenza			
10:30 - 11:00	Meeting with Lead Economist and Technical Assistant to the Minister's Office, Ministry of Industry and Foreign Trade	Ms Nermine Abulata, Dr. Samir A. El-Gammal, Mrs. Manal Mamdouh,		MTI	Confirmed
11:00 - 11:30	Meeting with General Authority of Investment GAFI			MTI	Confirmed
11:30 - 12:00	Meeting with Chairman of Chamber of Food Industry	Mrs. Marwa Mahgoub Mr. Mohamed Shokry		MTI	Cancelled
1:30 - 2:30	Meeting with Team Leader of Entrust	Mr. Tamer El Meehy, Ms. Lamia Bulbul		Entrust office in Dokki	Confirmed
3:00 - 4:00	Meeting with ILO Senior Enterprise Development Specialist.	Mrs. Kholoud Al-Khaldi, Mr. Magdy Wahba		ILO Office	Confirmed
<u>Wednesday, 16 November</u>					
8:00 - 10:00	Travel to Beni Sweif				
10:00 - 11:00	Meeting with the Board and Executive Director of the Awlad Gaafar Farmer Association and farmers beneficiaries	Mr. Atef Malak Hana ,the chairperson and other board members	Awlad Gaafar Farmer Association	El Fashn	Confirmed
11:30 - 12:15	Visit the Shahrazad Factory	Mr. ibrahim El Daly			
12:30 - 1:30	Visit the Beni Suef Field Office + Lunch	Wagdy Saleh Ahmed El Sherif Hadeer Arafa Agronomists team	Field Office Manager Marketing Officer Administrative Assistant	Beni Sweif	Confirmed

2:00 - 3:00	Meeting with the Board and the Executive Director of the Post Harvest Center and beneficiaries and Trainees and a representative from the Ministry of Social Solidarity	Mr. Mostafa Abdel Zaher , the chairperson & other board members Mr. Salama Saad Nasr	Beni Soliman Farmer Association Undersecretary - Ministry of Social Solidarity	Beni Soliman	Confirmed
3:00 - 5:00	Travel Back to Cairo				
<u>Thursday, 17 November</u>					
8:00 - 11:00	Travel to Menia by car				
11:00 - 2:00	Meeting with the Farmer's Association and Post Harvest Center and Beneficiaries and Manager of the Regional Office of Assiut	Mr. Mahmoud Aboul Azayem ; the chairperson and other board members <u>Assuit Office Staff:</u> Mohamed Abdelgalil Usama Abdel Rahman	El Biho Farmer Association - Field office Manager Marketing Officer	El Biho	Confirmed
2:00 - 5:00	Travel back to Cairo				
<u>Friday, 18 November</u>					
All Day	Literature Review and Report Writing				
<u>Saturday, 19 November</u>					
All Day	Literature Review and Report Writing				
<u>Sunday, 20 November</u>					
7:00 9:00	Travel to Luxor (by plane)				
10:00 - 11:00	Visit the PHC and meeting with the Board and Beneficiaries	Mr. Hesham Shaqel , , the chairperson & other board members	Dandra Farmer Association	Qena	Confirmed

12:00 - 1:15	Luxor office, Lunch and presentation by the Staff and The chairman of Awlad Yeheia FA (Sohag) will come to attend the meeting	El Nopy Hefny Hany Saad El Din Asmaa Abdel Hady Agronomists team	Field office Manager Marketing Officer Administrative Assistant	Luxor office	Confirmed
	Meeting with the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Agriculture in Luxor Governorate	Mr. Youssef Abdel Latif	Chairperson Awlad Yehia Farmer Association		
		Mr. Ahmed El Katatny			
1:30 - 2:00	Visit the TOT training by ILO	Magdy Wahba	Project Coordinator, ILO		Confirmed
2:30 - 3:30	Visit the Farmer Association and Beneficiaries	Mr. Hassan Basry ; Chairperson & other board members	EL Tod Farmer Association	El Tod	Confirmed
5:00 - 7:00	Back to Cairo (by Plane)				
<u>Monday, 21 November</u>					
9:00 - 4:00	Meeting with the Project's Consultants	Ahmed Abulyazid	Institutional Consultant	PMU Office	Confirmed
		Farid Antoun	Advocacy Consultant		
		Herb Williamson	Agribusiness Development,		
		Walied Salam	Marketing Consultant		
		Ashraf Ameen	Legal Advisor		
		Hesham Badawy	Refrigeration Consultant		
		Adel Sabry	Technical Consultant		
		Khaled Hassanien	Technical Consultant		
		Mohamed Nabel	Technical Consultant		

<u>Tuesday, 22 November</u>					
10:00 - 11:00	Meeting with Head of Spanish Cooperation	Ms. Cruz Ciria Matilla, Luis de Torres	Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development	Spanish Cooperation	Confirmed
11:15 - 12:15	Meeting with Dr. Alaa Fahmy		Technical Advisor	Agriculture Technology Center	Confirmed
1 :00	Meeting with Social Fund for Development	Mrs. Ghada Fathi Waly	Managing Director	SFD	Confirmed
1:30 - 3:30	Meeting with the Evaluation Reference Group	PMC members		UNDP	Confirmed
		Farmer Associations Chairpersons			
<u>Wednesday, 23 November</u>					
9:00 - 12:00	Wrap up meeting with PMU	PMU Staff		PMU Office	Confirmed
1:00 - 1: 30	Debriefing to Mr. James Rawley, UN Resident Coordinator			PMU Office	Confirmed
1:30 – 3:30	National Steering Committee Meeting	NSC members are the representatives from:		PMU Office	Confirmed
		UNDP			
		UNIDO			
		ILO			
		UN Women			

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ministry of Industry & Foreign Trade

Spanish International Cooperation (aacid)


UNRC

Joint Program Manager

Thursday, 24 November

Departure

5.1. Annex 3: Programme and schedule of the MTE



5.2. Annex 4: Results Frame Work with disbursements and committed funds per Activity

A- JP Results Frame Work as of the Project Document (you will notice that the total amount planned for the JP in the project document is different than the calculated one here in under) (30 October 2011)

Programme Outputs	Activity	YEAR			UN AGENCY	RESPONSIBLE PARTY	Estimated Implementation Progress in USD			
		Y1	Y2	Y3			Total amount Planned for the JP	Estimated Total amount committed	Estimated Total Amount Disbursed	Estimated % Delivery rate of budget
More than 75% of crops purchased by high quality markets (export markets, major retailers, touristic establishments).	1.1.1 Conduct baseline investigation on current and potential crop composition, productivity, markets, marketing channels, etc. in the locations of selected FAS	x			UNDP	FAs, Private investors	30 000		30 000,00	100
					Participation of UNWOMEN in baseline survey		20 000		14 227	71
	1.1.2. Link the FAS to the GSB project the CSR centre and Growth of Inclusive Markets Programme	x			UNDP	FAs, Private investors				
	1.1.3. Provide Marketing services and legal/contract negotiation advice	x	x	x	UNDP	FAs, Private investors		33 159,70	46 663,97	22

Pro Poor Horticulture Value Chains in Upper Egypt

	1.1.3.1 Training and Capacity Building for Fas					100 000			
	1.1.3.2 Studies to identify new products and markets locally and internationally					70 000			
	1.1.3.3 TA in marketing including opportunity identification and actual marketing activities					100 000			
	1.1.3.4 legal assistance and TA in contract negotiation					100 000			
	Technical support	x	x	x	UNIDO	110 000	0	55000	50

300 Agribusiness workers including 75% women trained in harvesting and post harvesting operations	1.2. 1 Train Agricultural Workers on harvesting and post harvesting operations and food agribusiness practices with special emphasis on value addition		x	x	UNIDO	FAs, Private investors	246 000	15 006,00	140 000,00	63
	Gender sensitization				UNWOMEN		60 000	2 779,97	19 635,28	37
150 trained agribusiness Workers (including 75% women gainfully employed by PHCs)	1.3.1 Identify recruitment needs of PHCs		x	x	UNIDO	FAs, Private investors	140 000	40 000,00	0	29
	1.3.2 Identity and select outstanding graduates of training for recruitment by PHCs		X	x	UNIDO	FAs, Private investors				
	Gender sensitization				UNWOMEN		30 000			0
PHCs equipped and sustainability plans implemented	1.4.1 Assess existing capacities of selected PHCs	X	X	X	UNDP	FAs, Private investors	564 000	7 940,85	118 892,62	93
	1.4.2 Identify needed equipment	X	X	X	UNDP	FAs, Private investors		11 296,55	38 641,61	

PHCs system and capacity upgraded to meet international standards	1.4.3 Provide grants to PHCs	X	X	X	UNDP	FAs, Private investors		15 002,30	201 985,46	
	1.4.4 Develop internal administrative and financial systems of PHCs	X	X	X	UNDP	FAs, Private investors		18 799,44	29 311,72	
	1.4.5 Develop operational plans for services to be provided by PHCs	X	X	X	UNDP	FAs, Private investors		7 940,85	25 860,54	
	1.4.6 Develop financial sustainability plans for PHC			X	UNDP	FAs, Private investors		18 799,44	29 311,72	
					Technical Support by UNIDO		200 000			0
	1.5.1 Assist PHC to obtain the required certifications and systems (ISO 2200 certification for food safety management systems, Global Gap Certification, Traceability, Leaf, etc..) and to upgrade their management systems	X	X	X	UNIDO	FAs, Private investors, MOI				
	In depth analysis and preparation of individual implementation work plans for grower groups and PHCs	X			UNIDO	FAs, Private investors, MOI	100 000		100 000,00	100
	Awareness training on Quality and food safety management systems for farmers and PHCs	X			UNIDO	FAs, Private investors, MOI	100 000		100 000,00	100
	Advanced Workshops on the implementation of quality and food safety management systems for growers and PHCs		X		UNIDO	FAs, Private investors, MOI	300 000		34 000,00	11
	Upgrade management systems of PHCs and Grower Associations		X		UNIDO	FAs, Private investors, MOI	100 000		35 000,00	35

	Technical consultation during the implementation		X		UNIDO	FAs, Private investors, MOI	200 000	2 690,00	87 310,00	45
	Establishment of documentation systems			X	UNIDO	FAs, Private investors, MOI	100 000	10 000,00	40 000,00	50
	Pre and final audits and certification			X	UNIDO	FAs, Private investors, MOI	100 000	0	0	0
	1.5.2 Develop gender mainstreaming tools and provide gender sensitization for FA, PHCs and project staff	x	X		UNWOMEN	FAs, Private investors, MOI	160 000	227,00	14 773,00	9
	1.5.3 Implement the gender equality model to support the PHC to be granted the Gender Equity Seal from the Ministry of Investment		x	x	UNWOMEN	FAs, Private investors, MOI	120 000	43 876,50	8 243,00	43
FA capacity enhanced to sustainably deliver services to their members.	1.6.1 Conduct institutional baseline investigation to select 3 partner FA	X			UNDP	FAs	20 000		20 000,00	100
	1.6.2 Assess needs of farmers and agribusiness operators to identify needed services.	x			UNIDO	FAs	210 000		92 552,60	44
	1.6.3 Identify technical and organizational capacity requirements for the delivery of these services	x			UNIDO	FAs				
	1.6.4 Provide technical assistance and trainings needed to build the technical capacity of FAs	x	x	x	UNIDO	FAs				
	1.6.5 Provide BDS and extension services to farmers through FAs		x	X	UNDP	FAs				

	1.6.6 Provide TA to build internal management and financial systems	x	x		UNDP	FAs	80 000	11 971,15	40 257,07	65
Partnerships between private investors , small firms and FAs established	1.7.1 Conduct baseline investigation to identify potential private sector partners	x			UNDP	FAs, Private Investors	20 000		19 367,72	97
	1.7.2 Broker partnerships between private investors, FAs and small farmers	X	X	X	UNDP	FAs, Private investors				
	Governorate-level promotional events among small farmers				UNDP		60 000			0
	Annual National Conference				UNDP		180 000			0
	Business to Business meetings between private sector and small farmers.	x	x	x	UNDP		50 000	7 940,85	36 013,98	88
	1.7.3 Hold promotional workshops showcasing the work and the potential of the small farmers and FAs	x	x		UNDP	FAs, Private investors	110 000	7 940,85	25 860,54	31
Feasibility and potential of incorporation farmers in collective entrepreneurial	2.1.1 Comprehensive study on the transformation of farmers association into entrepreneurial forms of organization conducted		x		UNDP	FAs, MOI, MTI	150 000	86 860,85	25 860,54	75
	Technical Support				UNIDO		20 000	2 000,00	6 000,00	40
500 Farmers receive entrepreneurial	2.2.1 Assess farmers and operators entrepreneurship training needs	x	x	x	ILO	FAs	40 000	13 057,00	12 993,67	65

	2.2.2 Customize and deliver entrepreneurship skills courses to farmers (know about business KAB, start and improve your business SIYB, Expand your business EYB and start your waste reciting business SYWRB,	x	x	x	ILO	FA		36 600,00	23 642,68	
	- Adaption and translation of training material.	x	x	x	ILO	FA	150 000	36 600,00	23 642,68	40
	- Training of Trainers and Master Trainer	x	x	x	ILO	FA	150 000	36 093,00	12 667,77	33
	- Production of Trining Material and Business Games	x	x	x	ILO	FA	170 000	36 093,00	12 667,77	29
	Deliver of Training (2X500 trainees)	x	x	x	ILO	FA	400 000			0
Willingness of farmers to incorporate into entrepreneurial forms increased	2.3.1 Assess farmers' awareness levels of the merits incorporating in entrepreneurial forms		x		UNDP	FAs, MOI, MTI				
	2.3.2 Deliver awareness campaigns to convince small farmers in the targeted location of the merits of incorporating in entrepreneurial forms.		x	x	UNDP	FAs, MOI, MTI	350 000	7 940,85	25 860,54	10
					UNIDO		60 000	10 000,00		
At least one company established y small farmers	2.4.1 Provide legal assistance to small farmers establishing their collective entrepreneurial organization			x	UNDP	FAs, MOI, MTI	110 000	7 940,85	72 195,62	73

Policy constraints to incorporating small farmers in value chains on equitable basis identified	3.1.1 Policy study to identify policy constraints to incorporating small farmers in value chains on equitable basis		x		UNDP	FAs, MOI, MTI	250 000			0
	3.1.2 Develop Gender mainstreaming tools for the value chain related policies and legislation.			X	UNWOMEN	FAs, MOI, MTI	160 000			0
	3.1.3 Study on gender concerns		X		UNWOMEN	FAs, MOI, MTI				
	3.1.4 Study on labour concerns			X	ILO	FAs, MOI, MTI	50 000			0
					UNIDO		150 000	10 000,00	0,00	7
FA's advocacy capacity and involvement in government dialogue strengthened	3.2.1 Capacity building for advocacy			X	UNDP	FAs	210 000	15 009,86	59 686,23	36
	3.2.2 Training on Gender Issues			x	UNWOMEN	FAs	50 000	20 000,00		40
Success stories and lessons learned promoted	3.3.1 Documentation of the experiences in every governorate and making the case for investing with small farmers and linking them to marketing and brokerage services	x	x	x	UNDP	MTI, MOI	300 000	19 940,85	41 783,09	21
					UNIDO		50 000		20 190,00	40
					UNWOMEN		40 000	16 892,50	8 567,50	64
					ILO		40 000			0

Policy issues identified, disseminated and discussed with GOE	3.4.1 Develop Policy Briefs on a variety of pertinent issues (eg. Women Farmer Rights, labour issues, etc.) to support Policy Dialogues	x	x	UNDP	MTI, MOI, FAs	40 000	7 940,85	25 860,54	85
				UNIDO		120 000		3 000,00	3
				ILO		40 000			0
				UNWOMEN		48 000	2 688,50	2 856,50	12
	3.4.2 Facilitating policy dialogue with farmers, private investors an the government using business associations, creating a policy forum and platform to put small farmers; issues on the policy agenda	x	x	UNDP	MTI, MOI, FAs	160 422	7 940,85	25 860,54	21
	Total					7 088 422	628 970,41	1 806 243,50	34